CVE-2026-115563 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-345 vulnerability in mcp. A fix is available for mcp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Model Context Protocol Python SDK: OAuth client could send credentials to an authorization server chosen by the MCP server
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-115563.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
mcp🐍mcpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
In affected versions, the SDK's OAuth client support (mcp.client.auth) let the MCP server a client connected to decide where the client's OAuth credentials were sent:
- the authorization server metadata
issuerwas not validated on every discovery path, and - stored or pre-provisioned client credentials were not bound to the authorization server they belong to.
A malicious or compromised MCP server could therefore direct them to a token endpoint of its choosing:
- by naming its own authorization server in its protected resource metadata, or
- by publishing none and serving metadata that presents the user's real authorization server as the
issuer.
It would then receive the client_secret, authorization code and PKCE code_verifier meant for that real server (or, with PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider, a signed client assertion).
Am I affected?
Yes, if both of these hold:
- your application uses the SDK as an MCP client over HTTP with
OAuthClientProvider,ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider,PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvideror the deprecated 1.xRFC7523OAuthClientProvideras the transport'sauthhandler; - it may connect to an MCP server you do not fully trust while holding credentials for a legitimate authorization server (a pre-provisioned secret or signing key, or a stored client registration).
Affected versions:
- 1.9.1 through 1.29.1: no
issuercheck and no credential binding on any path. - 2.0.0 through 2.1.1: both missing whenever the server publishes no protected resource metadata (the legacy fallback) or answers
403 insufficient_scope. - Both lines, on every path:
ClientCredentialsOAuthProviderandPrivateKeyJWTOAuthProviderhad no way to name the authorization server their credentials belong to.
Not affected:
- MCP servers built with the SDK
- stdio clients
- clients that attach their own tokens or headers
The rating is scored for the unattended providers. With the interactive OAuthClientProvider a person has to start the sign-in; scored that way it is 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).
Fix
Upgrade to mcp 2.2.0 (2.x) or 1.30.0 (1.x) or later.
If you use ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider or PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider, upgrading changes nothing until you also pass issuer= (for example issuer="https://auth.example.com"):
- Without it they still follow whichever authorization server the MCP server advertises.
- Omitting it now emits a deprecation warning, and it becomes required in 3.0. On 1.30.0 it is a
DeprecationWarning, which Python hides by default. - The deprecated 1.x
RFC7523OAuthClientProviderhas noissueroption. Move to one of these two providers.
In the fixed versions the client also:
- works out which issuer it expects before fetching any authorization server metadata, on every path;
- refuses metadata whose
issuerdiffers, withOAuthFlowError; - binds stored registrations to that issuer, and discards one bound to a different issuer so the client registers again.
After upgrading:
- Stored registrations: a registration stored without an issuer stays unbound. That includes everything 1.x stored before 1.30.0. Clear stored OAuth client information once so the client registers again. If you placed a pre-registered client in storage yourself, set
issueron that record instead. - Past exposure: if such a client may have connected to an untrusted MCP server, rotate its client secret and revoke its tokens at the authorization server.
On earlier versions there is no workaround other than connecting OAuth-enabled clients only to MCP servers you trust.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | mcp | ≥ 2.0.0a1&&< 2.2.0 | 2.2.0pip install --upgrade 'mcp==2.2.0' |
| 🐍PyPI | mcp | ≥ 1.9.1&&< 1.30.0 | 1.30.0pip install --upgrade 'mcp==1.30.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mcp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update mcp to 2.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-115563 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-115563 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.