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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-116686 — mcp

MEDIUMFix: modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk@5ebdfed

CVE-2026-116686 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in mcp. A fix is available for mcp — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Model Context Protocol Python SDK: Client fetched server-chosen $ref URLs while validating tool results against output schemas

Also known asGHSA-rwrf-2pqf-9j8j
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 28, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-116686.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs27th percentile — riskier than 27% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-116686 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 396,966 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐍mcp🐍mcp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

In affected versions, when a connected MCP server declared an outputSchema for a tool, the SDK's client validated each call_tool result with jsonschema's default resolver, which fetches any $ref it cannot resolve locally by opening the URL. A server could therefore put an http://, https:// or file:// reference in a tool's output schema and make the client:

  • request that URL, or read that local file, from the client's own network position on every call of the tool (the content was used only as a schema and never sent back to the server), and
  • stall: the fetch ran synchronously on the event loop with no timeout, so a target that accepted the connection and then went quiet froze every session in the process for as long as it held the connection.

Am I affected?

Yes, if your application uses the SDK as an MCP client (ClientSession over any transport, ClientSessionGroup, or the 2.x Client) and calls tools on servers you do not fully control. There was no setting that turned the validation off.

Affected versions: 1.10.0 through 1.29.1, and 2.0.0 through 2.1.1.

Not affected: applications that only build servers. If nothing in your code uses ClientSession, ClientSessionGroup or the 2.x Client class, you are not affected.

Fix

Upgrade to mcp 1.30.0 (1.x) or 2.2.0 (2.x) or later. The client now resolves references only within the schema document the server sent (plus the standard JSON Schema metaschemas), so result validation performs no network or file access. A tool whose output schema points outside its own document fails at call time with RuntimeError (Invalid schema for tool ...); in-document references such as #/$defs/... work as before.

Until you can upgrade, call tools only on servers you trust. As a partial stopgap, skip tools whose outputSchema contains an $id, or a $ref / $dynamicRef that does not start with #.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImcp≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.2.02.2.0pip install --upgrade 'mcp==2.2.0'
🐍PyPImcp≥ 1.10.0&&< 1.30.01.30.0pip install --upgrade 'mcp==1.30.0'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mcp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update mcp to 2.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-116686 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary In affected versions, when a connected MCP server declared an `outputSchema` for a tool, the SDK's client validated each `call_tool` result with `jsonschema`'s default resolver, which fetches any `$ref` it cannot resolve locally by opening the URL. A server could therefore put an `http://`, `https://` or `file://` reference in a tool's output schema and make the client: - request that URL, or read that local file, from the client's own network position on every call of the tool (the content was used only as a schema and never sent back to the server), and - stall: the fetch ran sy
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-116686 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-116686: mcp — Fixed in 2.2.0