GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
HIGHGHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) CWE-427 vulnerability in github.com/moby/moby/v2. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/moby/moby/v2🐹github.com/docker/docker🐹github.com/moby/mobyReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.
Details
When handling PUT /containers/{id}/archive requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.
The executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.
Impact
Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.
Conditions for exploitation
- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary.
- The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via
docker cp -or by calling thePUT /containers/{id}/archiveAPI directly with compressed content.
Not affected
Standard docker cp usage is not affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default:
docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt
This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to docker cp or the PUT /containers/{id}/archive API, for example:
cat archive.tar.xz | docker cp - mycontainer:/dir
Decompression formats using pure Go implementations (bzip2, zstd, and gzip when the container image does not contain an unpigz binary) are also not affected.
Workarounds
- Only run containers from trusted images.
- Use authorization plugins to limit access to the
PUT /containers/{id}/archiveendpoint. - Avoid piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/moby/moby/v2 | all versions | 2.0.0-beta.14 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/docker/docker | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/moby/moby | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/moby/moby/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/moby/moby/v2 to 2.0.0-beta.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This is an Important vulnerability. A flaw in Moby and Docker Engine allows for arbitrary code execution with host root privileges. This occurs when a user uploads a compressed archive to a container, as the daemon incorrectly uses decompression binaries from the container's filesystem. This could lead to a complete…
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.