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CRITICAL severity

GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv — v2

CRITICALFix: argoproj/argo-cd@17b0df1

GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2. A fix is available for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Bypassing Brute Force Protection via Application Crash and In-Memory Data Loss

Also known asBIT-argo-cd-2024-21652BIT-argo-cd-2024-21662CVE-2024-21652CVE-2024-21662GHSA-2vgg-9h6w-m454GO-2024-2652
Published
Mar 18, 2024
Updated
Aug 7, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs53th percentile — riskier than 53% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An attacker can exploit a chain of vulnerabilities, including a Denial of Service (DoS) flaw and in-memory data storage weakness, to effectively bypass the application's brute force login protection. This makes the application susceptible to brute force attacks, compromising the security of all user accounts.

Details

The issue arises from two main vulnerabilities:

  1. The application crashes due to a previously described DoS vulnerability caused by unsafe array modifications in a multi-threaded environment.
  2. The application saves the data of failed login attempts in-memory, without persistent storage. When the application crashes and restarts, this data is lost, resetting the brute force protections.
// LoginAttempts is a timestamped counter for failed login attempts

type LoginAttempts struct {  
// Time of the last failed login LastFailed time.Time `json:"lastFailed"` // Number of consecutive login failures FailCount int `json:"failCount"`

}

By chaining these vulnerabilities, an attacker can circumvent the limitations placed on the number of login attempts.

PoC

  1. Run the provided PoC script.
  2. Observe that the script makes 6 login attempts, one more than the set limit of 5 failed attempts.
  3. This is made possible because the script triggers a server restart via the DoS vulnerability after 5 failed attempts, thus resetting the counter for failed login attempts.

Impact

This is a critical security vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass the brute force login protection mechanism. Not only can they crash the service affecting all users, but they can also make unlimited login attempts, increasing the risk of account compromise.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2all versions2.8.13go get github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2@v2.8.13
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2≥ 2.9.0&&< 2.9.92.9.9go get github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2@v2.9.9
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2≥ 2.10.0&&< 2.10.42.10.4go get github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2@v2.10.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2 to 2.8.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat OpenShift GitOps 1.10openshift-gitops-1/argocd-rhel8:v1.10.4-1RHSA-2024:1700
Red Hat OpenShift GitOps 1.11openshift-gitops-1/argocd-rhel8:v1.11.3-2RHSA-2024:1697
Red Hat OpenShift GitOps 1.12openshift-gitops-argocd-cli-0:1.12.1-5.el8RHSA-2024:1752
Red Hat OpenShift GitOps 1.12openshift-gitops-1/argocd-rhel8:v1.12.1-1RHSA-2024:1753

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An attacker can exploit a chain of vulnerabilities, including a Denial of Service (DoS) flaw and in-memory data storage weakness, to effectively bypass the application's brute force login protection. This makes the application susceptible to brute force attacks, compromising the security of all user accounts. ### Details The issue arises from two main vulnerabilities: 1. The application crashes due to a previously described DoS vulnerability caused by unsafe array modifications in a multi-threaded environment. 2. The application saves the data of failed login attempts in-memory,
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-x32m-mvfj-52xv: v2 DoS (Critical 9.8) | O3 Security