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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2 ech0

MEDIUM

GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) CWE-862 vulnerability in github.com/lin-snow/ech0. A fix is available for github.com/lin-snow/ech0 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Ech0's Missing Authorization on System Logs Allows Non-Admin Information Disclosure

Also known asCVE-2026-79669GO-2026-5701
Published
Apr 10, 2026
Updated
Aug 27, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs7th percentile — riskier than 7% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/lin-snow/ech0

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The system log endpoints (GET /api/system/logs, GET /api/system/logs/stream, WS /ws/system/logs) lack authorization checks, allowing any authenticated non-admin user to read and stream all server logs. These logs contain error stack traces, internal file paths, module names, and arbitrary structured fields that facilitate reconnaissance for further attacks.

Details

The dashboard routes in internal/router/dashboard.go:7-8 register log endpoints on the AuthRouterGroup without any RequireScopes middleware:

// internal/router/dashboard.go
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
	appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
	appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
	appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}

Compare with other admin-only routes that properly use RequireScopes:

// internal/router/setting.go — every route has RequireScopes
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/settings",
    middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
    h.SettingHandler.GetSiteSettings())

The AuthRouterGroup only applies JWTAuthMiddleware() (router.go:36), which validates the JWT and sets the viewer context but does not check admin status. The WSRouterGroup (router.go:37) has no middleware at all — the WebSocket handler only calls ParseToken to verify the JWT signature (dashboard.go:74) without any role/scope validation.

The handler (internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go:29-62) and service (internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go:21-27) contain zero authorization checks. Other services in the codebase properly enforce admin access:

  • internal/service/inbox/inbox.go:132ensureAdmin()
  • internal/service/migrator/migrator.go:360ensureAdmin()
  • internal/service/comment/comment.go:719requireAdmin()

Non-admin users are created with IsAdmin: false and IsOwner: false (internal/service/user/user.go:220-221) via the public registration endpoint.

The LogEntry struct (internal/util/log/log.go:78-87) exposes:

type LogEntry struct {
    Time   string         `json:"time"`
    Level  string         `json:"level"`
    Msg    string         `json:"msg"`
    Module string         `json:"module,omitempty"`
    Caller string         `json:"caller,omitempty"`   // internal file paths
    Error  string         `json:"error,omitempty"`     // error stack traces
    Fields map[string]any `json:"fields,omitempty"`    // arbitrary structured data
    Raw    string         `json:"raw,omitempty"`       // raw log lines
}

PoC

# 1. Register a non-admin user (system allows up to 5 users by default)
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/register \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Password123"}'

# 2. Login to get session token
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/login \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Password123"}' | jq -r '.data.token')

# 3. Read system logs — should require admin but doesn't
curl http://localhost:8080/api/system/logs \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: {"code":1,"data":[{"time":"...","level":"error","msg":"...","module":"...","caller":"internal/service/user/user.go:145","error":"...","fields":{...}},...]}

# 4. Subscribe to real-time log stream via SSE
curl -N "http://localhost:8080/api/system/logs/stream?token=$TOKEN"

# 5. Subscribe via WebSocket (WSRouterGroup has NO middleware)
# wscat -c "ws://localhost:8080/ws/system/logs?token=$TOKEN"

Impact

Any registered non-admin user can:

  • Read all historical system logs including error traces that reveal internal code paths, database errors, and application state
  • Stream real-time logs via SSE or WebSocket to monitor all server activity as it happens
  • Gather reconnaissance data — caller fields expose internal file paths and line numbers, error fields expose stack traces and database query failures, module fields map the internal architecture
  • Monitor other users' actions — authentication failures, registration events, and admin operations appear in logs

This information disclosure lowers the bar for chaining further attacks by revealing the application's internal structure, error handling patterns, and operational state.

Recommended Fix

Add RequireScopes middleware with an admin scope to the dashboard routes:

// internal/router/dashboard.go
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
	appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs",
		middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
		h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
	appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream",
		middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
		h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
	appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs",
		middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
		h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}

Additionally, the WebSocket handler should validate admin scope after parsing the token, since the WSRouterGroup lacks middleware:

// internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go — WSSubscribeSystemLogs
claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(token)
if err != nil {
    ctx.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"msg": "invalid token"})
    return
}
// Add admin check for WebSocket endpoint
if claims.TokenType == authModel.TokenTypeAccess && !containsScope(claims.Scopes, authModel.ScopeAdminSettings) {
    ctx.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"msg": "admin access required"})
    return
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/lin-snow/ech0all versions4.4.3go get github.com/lin-snow/ech0@v4.4.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lin-snow/ech0, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/lin-snow/ech0 to 4.4.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The system log endpoints (`GET /api/system/logs`, `GET /api/system/logs/stream`, `WS /ws/system/logs`) lack authorization checks, allowing any authenticated non-admin user to read and stream all server logs. These logs contain error stack traces, internal file paths, module names, and arbitrary structured fields that facilitate reconnaissance for further attacks. ## Details The dashboard routes in `internal/router/dashboard.go:7-8` register log endpoints on the `AuthRouterGroup` without any `RequireScopes` middleware: ```go // internal/router/dashboard.go func setupDashboardRout
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2: ech0 (Medium 4.3) | O3 Security