GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Path Traversal vulnerability in pnpm. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
pnpmnpmDescription
Summary
When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest name as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose package.json name is a scoped path traversal (@x/../../…/<abs path>) is therefore extracted outside node_modules, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, another package's code). Occurs during pnpm install even with --ignore-scripts (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.
Same class as the just-patched GHSA-hwx4 (transitive-dependency alias traversal) and GHSA-v23m (stage download manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved name.
Root cause
- The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw
path.join(modules, <resolved name>)ininstalling/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706,installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614, anddeps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233— without thesafeJoinModulesDirguard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222). The store location isnode_modules/.pnpm/<id>/node_modules/<name>, so a traversal<name>escapes. - The only resolve-time name gate (
resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753) rejects only unscoped names containing/, so a scoped@x/../..passes.
Steps to reproduce
Self-contained PoC (real [email protected]; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):
npm i [email protected]
# host a tarball whose package.json name = "@x/"+"../".repeat(25)+"<abs>/OUTSIDE"; victim depends on the http URL
pnpm install --ignore-scripts
Confirmed output (repro/poc.mjs, exit 0):
escape dir is outside the project : true
new file implanted outside node_modules : true
pre-existing file OVERWRITTEN : true
*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***
Remediation
Route the isolated-linker import-target joins (resolvePeers.ts:706, deps-resolver/index.ts:614, lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233) through safeJoinModulesDir (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce validate-npm-package-name on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at pickPackage.ts:753) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | pnpm | all versions | 10.34.5 |
| 📦npm | pnpm | ≥ 11.0.0&&< 11.11.0 | 11.11.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update pnpm to 10.34.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.