GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432
MEDIUMGHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.8) CWE-93 vulnerability in guzzlehttp/psr7. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
guzzlehttp/psr7: CRLF Injection in HTTP Start-Line Serialization
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 369,023 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
guzzlehttp/psr7Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
guzzlehttp/psr7 did not reject CR/LF characters in certain first-party HTTP start-line fields: the request method, protocol version, and response reason phrase. If an application placed attacker-controlled data into one of those fields and later serialized the PSR-7 message as raw HTTP/1.x, for example with Message::toString() or an equivalent serializer, the serialized message could contain attacker-controlled header lines. The issue can also be reached through Message::parseRequest() or Message::parseResponse() when malformed raw messages are parsed into first-party PSR-7 objects and then serialized again.
Creating or modifying a Request, Response, or other PSR-7 object alone is not sufficient. The issue requires the malformed message to be serialized and written to the network, forwarded, replayed, or otherwise processed by software that does not independently reject the malformed start line. This is not the normal request-sending path used by guzzlehttp/guzzle; applications using guzzlehttp/psr7 only through Guzzle's standard HTTP client APIs are not expected to be affected.
Applications are most likely to be affected when they manually serialize PSR-7 messages, forward raw HTTP messages, or use custom transports, proxying, crawling, webhook delivery, testing, or similar code. Depending on how downstream HTTP/1.1 components parse the serialized message, this may lead to header injection, response splitting, request smuggling, or cache poisoning.
Patches
The issue is patched in 2.12.1 and later. Starting in that release, guzzlehttp/psr7 rejects CR/LF characters in HTTP method, protocol version, and response reason phrase values before storing them in first-party message objects.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, reject CR/LF in untrusted method, protocol version, and reason phrase values before constructing or modifying PSR-7 messages.
Applications that parse, forward, replay, or serialize raw HTTP messages cannot work around the parser entry points by validating only after parsing. They should validate the raw start line before calling Message::parseRequest() or Message::parseResponse(), avoid reparsing untrusted raw messages, or upgrade. If an application runs with attacker-controlled synthetic $_SERVER values, validate REQUEST_METHOD and SERVER_PROTOCOL before calling ServerRequest::fromGlobals().
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | guzzlehttp/psr7 | all versions | 2.12.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for guzzlehttp/psr7. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update guzzlehttp/psr7 to 2.12.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-vm85-hxw5-5432 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.