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GHSA-v33r-r6h2-8wr7

MEDIUM

Kimai's API invoice endpoint missing customer-level access control (IDOR)

Also known asCVE-2026-28685
Published
Mar 4, 2026
Updated
Mar 6, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk32th percentile+0.38%
0.00%0.30%0.60%0.90%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘kimai/kimai

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

GET /api/invoices/{id} only checks the role-based view_invoice permission but does not verify the requesting user has access to the invoice's customer. Any user with ROLE_TEAMLEAD (which grants view_invoice) can read all invoices in the system, including those belonging to customers assigned to other teams.

Affected Code

src/API/InvoiceController.php line 92-101:

#[IsGranted('view_invoice')]           // Role check only, no customer access check
#[Route(methods: ['GET'], path: '/{id}', name: 'get_invoice', requirements: ['id' => '\d+'])]
public function getAction(Invoice $invoice): Response
{
    $view = new View($invoice, 200);
    $view->getContext()->setGroups(self::GROUPS_ENTITY);
    return $this->viewHandler->handle($view);  // Returns ANY invoice by ID
}

The web controller (src/Controller/InvoiceController.php line 304-307) correctly checks customer access:

#[IsGranted('view_invoice')]
#[IsGranted(new Expression("is_granted('access', subject.getCustomer())"), 'invoice')]
public function downloadAction(Invoice $invoice, ...): Response { ... }

The access attribute in CustomerVoter (line 71-87) verifies team membership, but this check is entirely missing from the API endpoint.

PoC

Tested against Kimai v2.50.0 (Docker: kimai/kimai2:apache).

Setup:

  • TeamA with CustomerA ("SecretCorp"), TeamB with CustomerB ("BobCorp")
  • Bob is a teamlead in TeamB only
  • An invoice exists for SecretCorp (TeamA)
# Bob (TeamB) reads SecretCorp (TeamA) invoice
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer BOB_TOKEN" http://localhost:8888/api/invoices/1

Response (200 OK):

{
  "invoiceNumber": "INV-2026-001",
  "total": 15000.0,
  "currency": "USD",
  "customer": {"name": "SecretCorp", ...}
}

Bob can also enumerate all invoices via GET /api/invoices — the list endpoint uses setCurrentUser() in the query but the single-item endpoint bypasses this entirely via Symfony ParamConverter.

Impact

Any teamlead can read all invoices across the system regardless of team assignment. Invoice data typically contains sensitive financial information (amounts, customer details, payment terms). In multi-team deployments this breaks the intended data isolation between teams.

Suggested Fix

Add the customer access check to the API endpoint, matching the web controller:

 #[IsGranted('view_invoice')]
+#[IsGranted(new Expression("is_granted('access', subject.getCustomer())"), 'invoice')]
 #[Route(methods: ['GET'], path: '/{id}', name: 'get_invoice')]
 public function getAction(Invoice $invoice): Response

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistkimai/kimaiall versions2.51.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for kimai/kimai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update kimai/kimai to 2.51.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v33r-r6h2-8wr7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v33r-r6h2-8wr7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-v33r-r6h2-8wr7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `GET /api/invoices/{id}` only checks the role-based `view_invoice` permission but does not verify the requesting user has `access` to the invoice's customer. Any user with `ROLE_TEAMLEAD` (which grants `view_invoice`) can read all invoices in the system, including those belonging to customers assigned to other teams. ## Affected Code `src/API/InvoiceController.php` line 92-101: ```php #[IsGranted('view_invoice')] // Role check only, no customer access check #[Route(methods: ['GET'], path: '/{id}', name: 'get_invoice', requirements: ['id' => '\d+'])] public function get
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-v33r-r6h2-8wr7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-v33r-r6h2-8wr7 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-v33r-r6h2-8wr7: kimai/kimai (Medium 6.5) | O3 Security