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CVE-2026-52827

CVE-2026-52827 is a security vulnerability in kimai/kimai. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-52827 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Kimai: Pre-2FA KIMAI_SESSION cookie grants full authenticated REST API access, bypassing TOTP

Published
Jul 14, 2026
Updated
Jul 14, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 14, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘kimai/kimai

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Two-factor authentication (TOTP) can be fully bypassed for the REST API. The KIMAI_SESSION cookie returned in the response to the login request; issued after only the password is verified, before the TOTP step; is already accepted as authenticated by every /api/* endpoint.

So after submitting just the password, the web UI correctly holds the browser at the TOTP screen (/en/auth/2fa), but the cookie from that same login response can be replayed against the API to act as the user without ever entering the second factor. This affects any account with 2FA enabled and requires only the account password.

Details

Affected Component

  • The API firewall / authorization.

config/packages/security.yaml guards the API with { path: '^/api', roles: IS_AUTHENTICATED }. During 2FA the session carries a Scheb TwoFactorToken, which satisfies IS_AUTHENTICATED (it is a real, non-anonymous token). App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher returns !$request->hasPreviousSession(), so a request that carries the login session skips the stateless API firewall and is served by the main session firewall; Scheb's TwoFactorAccessDecider::isAccessible() then evaluates IS_AUTHENTICATED to true for ^/api and lets it through, and App\Voter\ApiVoter grants API to any token whose user is a User. Web routes are not affected because they require concrete roles (e.g. ROLE_USER) that a TwoFactorToken does not hold.

PoC

A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.

Impact

Two-factor authentication provides no protection for the REST API. If an attacker obtains a user's password (phishing, credential stuffing, reuse, breach); exactly the threat 2FA is meant to defend against; they get full authenticated API access as that user without the second factor. The whole exploit is a single cookie taken from the login response; no API token, Bearer header or CSRF token is required.

Solution

  • The /api/ firewall now uses IS_AUTHENTICATED_REMEMBERED which is only assigned after 2FA. The historically used IS_AUTHENTICATED flag is applied immediately after login and before 2FA happened.
  • The APIVoter checks both $token instanceof TwoFactorTokenInterface and isGranted('IS_AUTHENTICATED_2FA_IN_PROGRESS', $user) to make sure that the user is not currently in the 2FA step.
  • Regression tests were added to prevent future escalation of the same issue.

See https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-v8hx-4vx8-wc96 for more information.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistkimai/kimaiall versions2.59.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for kimai/kimai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update kimai/kimai to 2.59.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-52827 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-52827 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-52827. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Two-factor authentication (TOTP) can be fully bypassed for the REST API. The `KIMAI_SESSION` cookie returned in the response to the login request; issued after only the password is verified, before the TOTP step; is already accepted as authenticated by every `/api/*` endpoint. So after submitting just the password, the web UI correctly holds the browser at the TOTP screen (`/en/auth/2fa`), but the cookie from that same login response can be replayed against the API to act as the user without ever entering the second factor. This affects any account with 2FA enabled and requires on
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-52827 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-52827 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

CVE-2026-52827: kimai/kimai Cross-Site… | O3 Security