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HIGH severity

GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h — pnpm

HIGHFix: pnpm/pnpm#12303

GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) Path Traversal vulnerability in pnpm. A fix is available for pnpm — see the affected versions and patch details below.

pnpm: `stage download` writes outside its destination directory via manifest name/version traversal

Also known asCVE-2026-55700
Published
Jun 26, 2026
Updated
Jun 27, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 25, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs33th percentile — riskier than 33% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 379,145 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

400other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
pnpmnpm
170.1Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

The staged-tarball filename traversal reported as GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h / CAND-PNPM-038 is fixed on main by pnpm/pnpm#12303, merged as 65443f4bdf1f0db9c8c7dc58fee25252607e9234.

Before the fix, pnpm stage download derived a local filename from registry-controlled package name and version fields. A crafted manifest could escape the selected download directory and overwrite another reachable file. The merged fix validates both fields, derives one safe filename, and verifies the final destination before writing.

Security boundary

  • Package names and semantic versions are validated before they can influence a local filename.
  • POSIX and Windows path separators are rejected by basename checks.
  • Stage download and tarball summary paths use the same filename helper.
  • The resolved output path must remain an immediate child of the selected download directory.
  • The stage identifier is already constrained to a UUID.

Exploit replay

Before 65443f4bdf, a traversal-bearing manifest version could make the command write outside the selected directory. After the fix, malicious package names fail with ERR_PNPM_INVALID_PACKAGE_NAME, malicious versions fail with ERR_PNPM_INVALID_PACKAGE_VERSION, no outside file is created, and the download directory remains empty.

Files changed

  • releasing/commands/src/tarball/safeTarballFilename.ts validates manifest identity and rejects cross-platform path separators.
  • releasing/commands/src/stage/download.ts verifies the resolved destination before writing.
  • releasing/commands/src/tarball/summarizeTarball.ts uses the same filename contract.
  • releasing/commands/test/stage.test.ts covers traversal through both package name and version.
  • .changeset/stale-stage-tarballs.md includes patch bumps for @pnpm/releasing.commands and pnpm.

Patch

  • Merged PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12303
  • Fix commit: 65443f4bdf1f0db9c8c7dc58fee25252607e9234
  • The private candidate branch was not submitted because it conflicts with and is superseded by the merged fix. The upstream patch is slightly stronger because it covers malicious package names as well as versions.

Commands run

$ git diff --check 65443f4bdf^ 65443f4bdf
PASS
$ gh pr view 12303 --repo pnpm/pnpm --json state,mergeCommit,statusCheckRollup
MERGED as 65443f4bdf

Validation

  • Upstream regression coverage rejects traversal through both manifest name and version and verifies that no outside file is created.
  • Compile and lint, dependency audit, Linux Node.js 22/24/26, CodeQL, and zizmor checks passed on the merged public PR.
  • The Windows Node.js 22 full-suite job timed out in the unrelated pnpm/test/dlx.ts cache test after 512 other tests passed. The PR was merged by the maintainer; the failure did not involve the staging code.
  • The earlier private candidate's focused exploit regression, positive control, package compile, ESLint, and git diff --check also passed.

Compatibility

Staging and release commands are TypeScript-only. Pacquet does not expose this command family, so no Rust-side port is required.

Remaining risk

The final fs.writeFile follows a pre-existing symlink at the exact in-directory output name. That requires separate local filesystem access and is not controllable through the registry manifest traversal described here.


Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmpnpm≥ 11.3.0&&< 11.5.311.5.3npm install pnpm@11.5.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pnpm to 11.5.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The staged-tarball filename traversal reported as GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h / CAND-PNPM-038 is fixed on `main` by [pnpm/pnpm#12303](https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12303), merged as `65443f4bdf1f0db9c8c7dc58fee25252607e9234`. Before the fix, `pnpm stage download` derived a local filename from registry-controlled package name and version fields. A crafted manifest could escape the selected download directory and overwrite another reachable file. The merged fix validates both fields, derives one safe filename, and verifies the final destination before writing. ## Security boundary - P
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h: pnpm (High 7.1) | O3 Security