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HIGH severity

GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7

HIGH

GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) CWE-693 vulnerability in github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

CrowdSec AppSec silently drops request body for chunked / HTTP-2 requests

Also known asCVE-2026-44982GO-2026-5641
Published
May 27, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs30th percentile — riskier than 30% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 363,908 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The CrowdSec AppSec component fails to read the HTTP request body for any request whose Content-Length is not positive — most notably HTTP/1.1 requests using Transfer-Encoding: chunked and HTTP/2 requests sent without a content-length header. Coraza is then evaluated against an empty body, so every WAF rule targeting REQUEST_BODY, BODY_ARGS, ARGS_POST, JSON, or XML silently fails to match.

An unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the entire AppSec body-inspection pipeline by changing a single framing header on an otherwise-malicious request. The bypassed request is forwarded as allow and produces no WAF log entry.

Affected versions

  • github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec — all releases up to and including v1.7.7.

Affected component

pkg/appsec/request.go, function NewParsedRequestFromRequest.

Root cause

func NewParsedRequestFromRequest(r *http.Request, logger *log.Entry) (ParsedRequest, error) {
    var err error
    contentLength := max(r.ContentLength, 0)
    body := make([]byte, contentLength)
    if r.Body != nil {
        _, err = io.ReadFull(r.Body, body)
        if err != nil {
            return ParsedRequest{}, fmt.Errorf("unable to read body: %s", err)
        }
        r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewBuffer(body))
    }
    ...
}

Go's net/http server sets r.ContentLength = -1 when the request uses Transfer-Encoding: chunked with no Content-Length header, or when an HTTP/2 request omits the content-length pseudo-header (DATA-frame-only body). With ContentLength == -1:

  1. max(-1, 0) evaluates to 0.
  2. make([]byte, 0) allocates a zero-length slice.
  3. io.ReadFull on a zero-length buffer needs zero bytes and returns immediately without touching r.Body.
  4. The empty buffer is written back onto the request and onto the cloned request constructed later in the same function.

Every downstream consumer then sees an empty body. In the AppSec runner, WriteRequestBody is skipped because the parsed body has zero length, and ProcessRequestBody runs against nothing.

Impact

Every body-scanning rule is bypassed for any request whose framing makes Content-Length non-positive. In default CrowdSec deployments using the standard AppSec collections, the bypass affects any rule with zones containing BODY_ARGS, JSON, XML, REQUEST_BODY, or ARGS_POST.

No configuration option mitigates the issue — the defect is in the request parser, not in any ruleset. Bypassed requests do not produce a WAF log entry, so operators have no signal that rules are being skipped.

Header-only and URI-only rules are unaffected.

Workarounds

No complete workaround is available.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec1.5.0&&< 1.7.81.7.8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec to 1.7.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The CrowdSec AppSec component fails to read the HTTP request body for any request whose `Content-Length` is not positive — most notably HTTP/1.1 requests using `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and HTTP/2 requests sent without a `content-length` header. Coraza is then evaluated against an empty body, so every WAF rule targeting `REQUEST_BODY`, `BODY_ARGS`, `ARGS_POST`, `JSON`, or `XML` silently fails to match. An unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the entire AppSec body-inspection pipeline by changing a single framing header on an otherwise-malicious request. The bypassed requ
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7: crowdsec (High 7.2) | O3 Security