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GHSA-rh42-6rj2-xwmc

LOW

Kimai leaks API Token Hash via Invoice Twig Template

Published
Apr 14, 2026
Updated
Apr 14, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘kimai/kimai

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Description

Summary

The Twig sandbox used for invoice templates blocks certain sensitive User methods (password, TOTP secret, etc.) via a blocklist in StrictPolicy::checkMethodAllowed(). However, getApiToken() and getPlainApiToken() are not on the blocklist. An admin who creates an invoice template can embed calls to these methods, causing the bcrypt or sodium hashed API password of any user who generates an invoice using that template to be included in the rendered output.

Only relevant for OnPremise installations with template upload activated.

Background

Kimai allows admins (ROLE_ADMIN and above) with the manage_invoice_template permission to create Twig-based invoice templates. These templates are rendered in a sandboxed Twig environment with StrictPolicy controlling which methods and properties are accessible.

StrictPolicy explicitly blocks:

// src/Twig/SecurityPolicy/StrictPolicy.php:156
if (\in_array($lcm, [
    'getpassword',
    'gettotpsecret',
    'getplainpassword',
    'getconfirmationtoken',
    'gettotpauthenticationconfiguration'
], true)) {
    throw new SecurityNotAllowedMethodError(...);
}

getApiToken() and getPlainApiToken() are not in this list and are freely callable.

Vulnerable Code

StrictPolicy.php — missing entries in the User method blocklist:

// Current
['getpassword', 'gettotpsecret', 'getplainpassword', 'getconfirmationtoken', 'gettotpauthenticationconfiguration']

// Should also include:
'getapitoken', 'getplainapitoken'

The invoice model passes a User object through model.user, accessible in any twig invoice template.

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Log in as an admin with the manage_invoice_template permission.
  2. Create a new Twig invoice template (HTML or PDF) containing:
API Token: {{ model.user.getApiToken() }}
Plain Token: {{ model.user.getPlainApiToken() }}
  1. Save the template and set it as the default for a customer.
  2. Log in as a regular user assigned to that customer and generate an invoice.
  3. Observe that the rendered invoice contains the user's API token in plaintext.

Impact

An admin can silently embed token-exfiltration code in a shared invoice template. Every user who subsequently generates an invoice using that template will have their hashed API token leaked into the invoice output.

  • API passwords are deprecated since April 2024 and not in wide use anymore (especially by new users)
  • The function getPlainApiToken() does NEVER return any data
  • The function getApiToken() might return a bcrypt or sodium hashed API password, if the user (who created the invoice) has configured one - this cannot be used, but needs to be cracked using rainbow tables
  • The cloud does not allow Twig template upload, this is only relevant for OnPremise installations with template upload activated

Fix

The SecurityPolicy was changed to exclude methods that contains certain trigger words instead of using the hard-coded list, see https://github.com/kimai/kimai/pull/5878

This disables access to both the getApiToken() and getPlainApiToken() function.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistkimai/kimaiall versions2.53.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for kimai/kimai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update kimai/kimai to 2.53.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rh42-6rj2-xwmc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rh42-6rj2-xwmc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rh42-6rj2-xwmc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The Twig sandbox used for invoice templates blocks certain sensitive `User` methods (password, TOTP secret, etc.) via a blocklist in `StrictPolicy::checkMethodAllowed()`. However, `getApiToken()` and `getPlainApiToken()` are not on the blocklist. An admin who creates an invoice template can embed calls to these methods, causing the bcrypt or sodium hashed API password of any user who generates an invoice using that template to be included in the rendered output. Only relevant for OnPremise installations with template upload activated. ## Background Kimai allows admins (`ROLE_ADM
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rh42-6rj2-xwmc in your dependencies?

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