GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.1) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in @angular/platform-server. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
@angular/platform-server: SSRF via Hostname Hijacking
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@angular/platform-servernpmDescription
Impact
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in @angular/platform-server. The issue stems from how the server-side rendering (SSR) engine processes the request URL provided to the rendering entry points.
When an absolute-form URL (e.g., http://evil.com) is passed to the rendering engine, the internal ServerPlatformLocation can be manipulated into adopting the attacker-controlled domain as the "current" hostname.
Consequently, any relative HttpClient requests or PlatformLocation.hostname references are redirected to the attacker controlled server, potentially exposing internal APIs or metadata services.
Fix Information
The vulnerability is mitigated by introducing an Allowlist Mechanism directly into the core rendering APIs. The renderModule and renderApplication functions now include an allowedHosts configuration option. The rendering engine validates the hostname extracted from the request URL against this list before proceeding. If the hostname does not match an allowed entry, the engine prevents the hostname hijacking, ensuring that HttpClient requests remain restricted to trusted domains.
Patches
- 22.0.0-next.12
- 21.2.13
- 20.3.21
- 19.2.22
Workarounds
Developers unable to update immediately should implement strict URL validation in their server entry point (e.g., server.ts). Ensure that req.url is validated against a known list of trusted hostnames or normalized to a relative path before being passed torenderApplication or renderModule.
// Example manual normalization in Express
app.get('*', (req, res, next) => {
const trustedHost = 'localhost:4000';
// Ensure the request target matches expectations
if (req.headers.host !== trustedHost) {
return res.status(403).send('Forbidden');
}
next();
});
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @angular/platform-server | ≥ 22.0.0-next.0&&< 22.0.0-next.12 | 22.0.0-next.12 |
| 📦npm | @angular/platform-server | ≥ 21.0.0-next.0&&< 21.2.13 | 21.2.13 |
| 📦npm | @angular/platform-server | ≥ 20.0.0-next.0&&< 20.3.21 | 20.3.21 |
| 📦npm | @angular/platform-server | ≥ 19.0.0-next.0&&< 19.2.22 | 19.2.22 |
| 📦npm | @angular/platform-server | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @angular/platform-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @angular/platform-server to 22.0.0-next.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-rfh7-fxqc-q52v across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.