Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐘
🐘 Packagist
Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr

MEDIUMFix: symfony/symfony#44243

GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-384 vulnerability in symfony/security-bundle. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Cookie persistence after password changes in symfony/security-bundle

Also known asBIT-symfony-2021-41268CVE-2021-41268
Published
Nov 24, 2021
Updated
Jul 8, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs67th percentile — riskier than 67% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 365,433 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐘symfony/security-bundle🐘symfony/symfony

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Description

Since the rework of the Remember me cookie in Symfony 5.3, the cookie is not invalidated anymore when the user changes its password.

Attackers can therefore maintain their access to the account even if the password is changed as long as they have had the chance to login once and get a valid remember me cookie.

Resolution

Symfony now makes the password part of the signature by default. In that way, when the password changes then the cookie is not valid anymore.

The patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.3.

Credits

We would like to thank Thibaut Decherit for reporting the issue and Wouter J for fixing the issue.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistsymfony/security-bundle5.3.0&&< 5.3.125.3.12
🐘Packagistsymfony/symfony5.3.0&&< 5.3.125.3.12

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for symfony/security-bundle. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update symfony/security-bundle to 5.3.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Description ----------- Since the rework of the Remember me cookie in Symfony 5.3, the cookie is not invalidated anymore when the user changes its password. Attackers can therefore maintain their access to the account even if the password is changed as long as they have had the chance to login once and get a valid remember me cookie. Resolution ---------- Symfony now makes the password part of the signature by default. In that way, when the password changes then the cookie is not valid anymore. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/36a808b
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr: symfony/security-bun… | O3 Security