GHSA-qr8r-m495-7hc4
Validation of `VoteExtensionsEnableHeight` can cause chain halt in Go package github.com/cometbft/cometbft
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
A vulnerability in CometBFT’s validation logic for VoteExtensionsEnableHeight can result in a chain halt when triggered through a governance parameter change proposal on an ABCI2 Application Chain. If a parameter change proposal including a VoteExtensionsEnableHeight modification is passed, nodes running the affected versions may panic, halting the network.
The CometBFT team addressed this issue by improving validation logic for the VoteExtensionsEnableHeight to correctly handle governance proposals addressing this parameter.
Next Steps for Impacted Parties
If you are a chain developer with an active network running on CometBFT v. 0.38.x, we recommend updating your chain application to v0.38.3 or later of CometBFT to patch this issue.
This issue can be resolved with a “soft patch” to an active network, i.e. nodes can be patched and restarted at different times without the need for a coordinated upgrade that halts a chain. If this patching methodology is used, the risk of a network halt triggered by this issue is mitigated once more than 66.7% of voting power on the network has applied the update, which provides protection from exploitation while on-chain governance processes for software upgrades take place. Once all validator nodes operating a network have been updated, the risk of a network halt due to this issue will be fully resolved.
For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/.
This issue was found by Dongsam (@b_harvest) who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on January 15, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | ≥ 0.38.0&&< 0.38.3 | 0.38.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cometbft/cometbft. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/cometbft/cometbft to 0.38.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qr8r-m495-7hc4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qr8r-m495-7hc4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-qr8r-m495-7hc4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-qr8r-m495-7hc4 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-qr8r-m495-7hc4 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.