GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxv
ASA-2024-004: Default configuration param for Evidence may limit window of validity
Blast Radius
github.com/cometbft/cometbftReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
ASA-2024-004: Default configuration param for Evidence may limit window of validity
Component: CometBFT Criticality: Low Affected versions: All Affected users: Validators, Chain Builders + Maintainers
Summary
A default configuration in CometBFT has been found to be small for common use cases, and may prevent the slashing mechanism from working in specific cases. The default values for EvidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks and EvidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration consensus parameters may not be sufficient for common use cases to provide coverage for the entire unbonding period for a chain (Staking.UnbondingTime). If the conditions of both of these parameters are exceeded, evidence may be prematurely expired and considered no longer valid, potentially allowing for unpunished Byzantine behavior if evidence is discovered outside of that window.
Next Steps for Chains and Validators
It is recommended that chain ecosystems and their maintainers set the consensus parameters EvidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks and EvidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration to values appropriate for their use case:
EvidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration(set in nanoseconds) should exceed the duration of the chain’s unbonding periodEvidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocksshould exceed the number of estimated blocks that will be produced by your chain throughout the unbonding period
For more information about evidence in CometBFT, please see: https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.37/spec/consensus/evidence.
For more information about the cosmos-sdk x/staking and x/slashing modules, and UnbondingTime parameter, please see: https://docs.cosmos.network/v0.50/build/modules/staking and https://docs.cosmos.network/v0.50/build/modules/slashing.
CometBFT is designed to be configurable by chains, and implements many different configuration variables and parameters to allow chain developers, validators, node operators, and chain participants to customize it best to their use case.
As more chains adopt the Interchain Stack for new and cutting-edge use cases, the CometBFT team recommends that all chains regularly evaluate their consensus parameters and configurations to ensure they meet the needs of their ecosystem as their networks mature.
A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the CometBFT repository. For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/.
This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on February 15, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cometbft/cometbft. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/cometbft/cometbft has shipped for GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxv yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxv across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.