How severe is GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7?

GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 affects the following packages: github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go), github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7?

Update github.com/cometbft/cometbft to 0.37.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cometbft/cometbft. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 was published on June 28, 2024 and was last updated on July 5, 2024. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7

CometBFT is unstability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer

Also known asGO-2024-2951

Published

Jun 28, 2024

Updated

Jul 5, 2024

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

2 / 2

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/cometbft/cometbft🐹github.com/cometbft/cometbft

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Name: ASA-2024-008: Instability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer Component: CometBFT Criticality: Medium (ACMv1: I:Moderate; L: Possible) Affected versions: < v0.38.7

Summary

An issue was identified for nodes syncing on an existing network during blocksync in which a malicious peer could cause the syncing peer to panic, enter into a catastrophic invalid syncing state or get stuck in blocksync mode, never switching to consensus. It is recommended for all clients to adopt this patch so that blocksync functions as expected and is tolerant of malicious peers presenting invalid data in this situation. Nodes that are vulnerable to this state may experience a Denial of Service condition in which syncing will not work as expected when joining a network as a client.

Recognition

This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on 5/01/24 by unknown_feature. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.

If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [email protected].

For more information about CometBFT, please see https://docs.cometbft.com/.

For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/cometbft/cometbft`	≥ 0.37.0&&< 0.37.7	0.37.7
🐹Go	`github.com/cometbft/cometbft`	≥ 0.38.0&&< 0.38.8	0.38.8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cometbft/cometbft. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/cometbft/cometbft to 0.37.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Name**: ASA-2024-008: Instability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer **Component**: CometBFT **Criticality**: Medium ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Moderate; L: Possible) **Affected versions**: < v0.38.7 # Summary An issue was identified for nodes syncing on an existing network during blocksync in which a malicious peer could cause the syncing peer to panic, enter into a catastrophic invalid syncing state or get stuck in blocksync mode, never switching to consensus. It is recommended for all clients to adop

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works