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Maven

GHSA-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h

HIGH

Absent Input Validation in BinaryHttpParser

Also known asCVE-2024-40642
Published
Jul 18, 2024
Updated
Jul 19, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk47th percentile-0.03%
0.17%0.59%1.00%1.42%0.7%0.7%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

BinaryHttpParser does not properly validate input values thus giving attackers almost complete control over the HTTP requests constructed from the parsed output. Attackers can abuse several issues individually to perform various injection attacks including HTTP request smuggling, desync attacks, HTTP header injections, request queue poisoning, caching attacks and Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Attacker could also combine several issues to create well-formed messages for other text-based protocols which may result in attacks beyond the HTTP protocol.

Details

Path, Authority, Scheme The BinaryHttpParser class implements the readRequestHead method which performs most of the relevant parsing of the received request. The data structure prefixes values with a variable length integer value. The algorithm to create a variable length integer value is below:

def encode_int(n):
    if n < 64:
        base = 0x00
        l = 1
    elif n in range(64, 16384):
        base = 0x4000
        l = 2
    elif n in range(16384, 1073741824):
        base = 0x80000000
        l = 4
    else:
        base = 0xc000000000000000
        l = 8
   encoded = base | n
   return encoded.to_bytes()

The parsing code below first gets the lengths of the values from the prefixed variable length integer. After it has all of the lengths and calculates all of the indices, the parser casts the applicable slices of the ByteBuf to String. Finally, it passes these values into a new DefaultBinaryHttpRequest object where no further parsing or validation occurs.

//netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java

public final class BinaryHttpParser {
   ...
    private static BinaryHttpRequest readRequestHead(ByteBuf in, boolean knownLength, int maxFieldSectionSize) {
        ...
        final long pathLength = getVariableLengthInteger(in, pathLengthIdx, pathLengthBytes);
        ...
        final int pathIdx = pathLengthIdx + pathLengthBytes;
        ...
/*417*/ String method = in.toString(methodIdx, (int) methodLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);
/*418*/ String scheme = in.toString(schemeIdx, (int) schemeLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);
/*419*/ String authority = in.toString(authorityIdx, (int) authorityLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);
/*420*/ String path = in.toString(pathIdx, (int) pathLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);

/*422*/ BinaryHttpRequest request = new DefaultBinaryHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.valueOf(method),
                scheme, authority, path, headers);
        in.skipBytes(sumBytes);
        return request;
    }
   ...
}

Request Method On line 422 above, the parsed method value is passed into HttpMethod.valueOf method. The return value from this is passed to the DefaultBinaryHttpRequest constructor.

Below is the code for HttpMethod.valueOf:

    public static HttpMethod valueOf(String name) {
        // fast-path
        if (name == HttpMethod.GET.name()) {
            return HttpMethod.GET;
        }
        if (name == HttpMethod.POST.name()) {
            return HttpMethod.POST;
        }
        // "slow"-path
        HttpMethod result = methodMap.get(name);
        return result != null ? result : new HttpMethod(name);
    }

If the result of methodMap.get is not null, then a new arbitrary HttpMethod instance will be returned using the provided name value.

methodMap is an instance of type EnumNameMap which is also defined within the HttpMethod class:

        EnumNameMap(Node<T>... nodes) {
            this.values = (Node[])(new Node[MathUtil.findNextPositivePowerOfTwo(nodes.length)]);
            this.valuesMask = this.values.length - 1;
            Node[] var2 = nodes;
            int var3 = nodes.length;

            for(int var4 = 0; var4 < var3; ++var4) {
                Node<T> node = var2[var4];
                int i = hashCode(node.key) & this.valuesMask;
                if (this.values[i] != null) {
                    throw new IllegalArgumentException("index " + i + " collision between values: [" + this.values[i].key + ", " + node.key + ']');
                }

                this.values[i] = node;
            }

        }

        T get(String name) {
            Node<T> node = this.values[hashCode(name) & this.valuesMask];
            return node != null && node.key.equals(name) ? node.value : null;
        }

Note that EnumNameMap.get() returns a boolean value, which is not null. Therefore, any arbitrary http verb used within a BinaryHttpRequest will yield a valid HttpMethod object. When the HttpMethod object is constructed, the name is checked for whitespace and similar characters. Therefore, we cannot perform complete injection attacks using the HTTP verb alone. However, when combined with the other input validation issues, such as that in the path field, we can construct somewhat arbitrary data blobs that satisfy text-based protocol message formats.

Impact

Method is partially validated while other values are not validated at all. Software that relies on netty to apply input validation for binary HTTP data may be vulnerable to various injection and protocol based attacks.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenio.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttpall versions0.0.13.Final

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp to 0.0.13.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `BinaryHttpParser` does not properly validate input values thus giving attackers almost complete control over the HTTP requests constructed from the parsed output. Attackers can abuse several issues individually to perform various injection attacks including HTTP request smuggling, desync attacks, HTTP header injections, request queue poisoning, caching attacks and Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Attacker could also combine several issues to create well-formed messages for other text-based protocols which may result in attacks beyond the HTTP protocol. ### Details **Path, Aut
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.