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GHSA-q63q-pgmf-mxhr — @angular/ssr

Fix: angular/angular-cli@5271547

GHSA-q63q-pgmf-mxhr is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in @angular/ssr. A fix is available for @angular/ssr — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Angular SSR has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw

Also known asCVE-2025-62427
Published
Oct 16, 2025
Updated
Oct 16, 2025
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q63q-pgmf-mxhr.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs35th percentile — riskier than 35% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

97other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@angular/ssrnpm
566Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

The vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (@angular/ssr).

The function createRequestUrl uses the native URL constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., originalUrl or url) begins with a double forward slash (//) or backslash (\\), the URL constructor treats it as a schema-relative URL. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname.

This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page's virtual location (accessible via DOCUMENT or PlatformLocation tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent relative HTTP requests made during the SSR process (e.g., using HttpClient.get('assets/data.json')) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker's domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint.

Exploit Scenario

A request to http://localhost:4200//attacker-domain.com/some-page causes Angular to believe the host is attacker-domain.com. A relative request to api/data then becomes a server-side request to http://attacker-domain.com/api/data.

Patches

  • @angular/ssr 19.2.18
  • @angular/ssr 20.3.6
  • @angular/ssr 21.0.0-next.8

Mitigation

The application's internal location must be robustly determined from the incoming request. The fix requires sanitizing or validating the request path to prevent it from being interpreted as a schema-relative URL (i.e., ensuring it does not start with //).

Server-Side Middleware

If you can't upgrade to a patched version, implement a middleware on the Node.js/Express server that hosts the Angular SSR application to explicitly reject or sanitize requests where the path begins with a double slash (//).

Example (Express/Node.js):

// Place this middleware before the Angular SSR handler
app.use((req, res, next) => {
  if (req.originalUrl?.startsWith('//')) {
    // Sanitize by forcing a single slash
    req.originalUrl = req.originalUrl.replace(/^\/\/+/, '/');
    req.url = req.url.replace(/^\/\/+/, '/');
  }
  next();
});

References

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 19.0.0-next.0&&< 19.2.1819.2.18npm install @angular/ssr@19.2.18
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 20.0.0-next.0&&< 20.3.620.3.6npm install @angular/ssr@20.3.6
📦npm@angular/ssr≥ 21.0.0-next.0&&< 21.0.0-next.821.0.0-next.8npm install @angular/ssr@21.0.0-next.8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @angular/ssr, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @angular/ssr to 19.2.18 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q63q-pgmf-mxhr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The vulnerability is a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (`@angular/ssr`). The function `createRequestUrl` uses the native `URL` constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., `originalUrl` or `url`) begins with a **double forward slash (`//`) or backslash (`\\`)**, the `URL` constructor treats it as a **schema-relative URL**. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-q63q-pgmf-mxhr: @angular/ssr SSRF | O3 Security