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PocketBase vulnerable to account pre-hijacking via OAuth2 unverfied->verified autolinking upgradeGHSA-pq7p-mc74-g65w

GHSA-pq7p-mc74-g65w is a Improper Authentication vulnerability in github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase. A fix is available for github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-44166GO-2026-5548
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-pq7p-mc74-g65w.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs16th percentile — riskier than 16% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.0%0.2%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase🐹github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

A pre-hijacking issue was discovered with the OAuth2 autolinking by Alardiians.

In some situations, if an attacker knows the email address of the victim they can create and link an unverified PocketBase user in advance by authenticating with one of the OAuth2 app providers, e.g. "A". When the victim gets invited or decides to sign up to your app on their own with provider "B" (PocketBase OAuth2 auth requires to be with a different provider because we don't allow multiple OAuth2 accounts from the same provider to be associated to a single PocketBase user), the user created previously by the attacker will be autolinked, upgraded to "verified" and its old password reset.

The upgrade flow operates within the expectations but the problem is that I forgot to clear the previous OAuth2 link(s) leaving the attacker to still have access to the initially created user.

Or in other words, the vulnerability is similar to the mixed password + OAuth2 auth pre-hijacking issue that we had in the past but with a slightly different angle.

So with that in mind, and to avoid introducing breaking changes to the auth flows, a new fix was applied that automatically deletes all such pre-existing OAuth2 links on "unverified" to "verified" upgrades.

While the vulnerability requires some prerequisites, it is considered severe and it is strongly recommended to upgrade to v0.37.4 (or to v0.22.42 if you are using an older <v0.23.0 release).

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/pocketbase/pocketbaseall versions0.22.42go get github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase@v0.22.42
🐹Gogithub.com/pocketbase/pocketbase≥ 0.30.0&&< 0.37.40.37.4go get github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase@v0.37.4

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
pocketbasepocketbase
≥ 0.23.0 && < 0.37.4
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase to 0.22.42 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pq7p-mc74-g65w is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

A pre-hijacking issue was discovered with the OAuth2 autolinking by [Alardiians](https://github.com/Alardiians). In some situations, if an attacker knows the email address of the victim they can create and link an **unverified** PocketBase user in advance by authenticating with one of the OAuth2 app providers, e.g. "A". When the victim gets invited or decides to sign up to your app on their own with provider "B" _(PocketBase OAuth2 auth requires to be with a different provider because we don't allow multiple OAuth2 accounts from the same provider to be associated to a single PocketBase user)_
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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