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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2024-38351 — pocketbase

MEDIUMFix: pocketbase/pocketbase@58ace5d

CVE-2024-38351 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) Improper Authentication vulnerability in github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase. A fix is available for github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Password auth and OAuth2 unverified email linking

Also known asGHSA-m93w-4fxv-r35vGO-2024-2936
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-38351.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs25th percentile — riskier than 25% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.2%0.3%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

In order to be exploited you must have both OAuth2 and Password auth methods enabled.

A possible attack scenario could be:

  • a malicious actor register with the targeted user's email (it is unverified)
  • at some later point in time the targeted user stumble on your app and decides to sign-up with OAuth2 (this step could be also initiated by the attacker by sending an invite email to the targeted user)
  • on successful OAuth2 auth we search for an existing PocketBase user matching with the OAuth2 user's email and associate them
  • because we haven't changed the password of the existing PocketBase user during the linking, the malicious actor has access to the targeted user account and will be able to login with the initially created email/password

To prevent this for happening we now reset the password for this specific case if the previously created user wasn't verified (an exception to this is if the linking is explicit/manual, aka. when you send Authorization:TOKEN with the OAuth2 auth call).

Additionally to warn existing users we now send an email alert in case the user has logged in with password but has at least one OAuth2 account linked. It looks something like:

Hello, Just to let you know that someone has logged in to your Acme account using a password while you already have OAuth2 GitLab auth linked. If you have recently signed in with a password, you may disregard this email. If you don't recognize the above action, you should immediately change your Acme account password. Thanks, Acme team

The flow will be further improved with the ongoing refactoring and we will start sending emails for "unrecognized device" logins (OTP and MFA is already implemented and will be available with the next v0.23.0 release in the near future).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/pocketbase/pocketbaseall versions0.22.14go get github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase@v0.22.14

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase to 0.22.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-38351 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

**In order to be exploited you must have both OAuth2 and Password auth methods enabled.** A possible attack scenario could be: - a malicious actor register with the targeted user's email (it is unverified) - at some later point in time the targeted user stumble on your app and decides to sign-up with OAuth2 (_this step could be also initiated by the attacker by sending an invite email to the targeted user_) - on successful OAuth2 auth we search for an existing PocketBase user matching with the OAuth2 user's email and associate them - because we haven't changed the password of the existing Po
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-38351 in your dependencies?

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CVE-2024-38351: pocketbase — Fixed in 0.22.14