GHSA-m93w-4fxv-r35v
MEDIUMPocketBase performs password auth and OAuth2 unverified email linking
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/pocketbase/pocketbaseReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
In order to be exploited you must have both OAuth2 and Password auth methods enabled.
A possible attack scenario could be:
- a malicious actor register with the targeted user's email (it is unverified)
- at some later point in time the targeted user stumble on your app and decides to sign-up with OAuth2 (this step could be also initiated by the attacker by sending an invite email to the targeted user)
- on successful OAuth2 auth we search for an existing PocketBase user matching with the OAuth2 user's email and associate them
- because we haven't changed the password of the existing PocketBase user during the linking, the malicious actor has access to the targeted user account and will be able to login with the initially created email/password
To prevent this for happening we now reset the password for this specific case if the previously created user wasn't verified (an exception to this is if the linking is explicit/manual, aka. when you send Authorization:TOKEN with the OAuth2 auth call).
Additionally to warn existing users we now send an email alert in case the user has logged in with password but has at least one OAuth2 account linked. It looks something like:
Hello, Just to let you know that someone has logged in to your Acme account using a password while you already have OAuth2 GitLab auth linked. If you have recently signed in with a password, you may disregard this email. If you don't recognize the above action, you should immediately change your Acme account password. Thanks, Acme team
The flow will be further improved with the ongoing refactoring and we will start sending emails for "unrecognized device" logins (OTP and MFA is already implemented and will be available with the next v0.23.0 release in the near future).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase | all versions | 0.22.14 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/pocketbase/pocketbase to 0.22.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m93w-4fxv-r35v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-m93w-4fxv-r35v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-m93w-4fxv-r35v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-m93w-4fxv-r35v in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-m93w-4fxv-r35v across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.