How severe is GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv?

GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv has a CVSS score of 6.8/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv?

GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv affects the following packages: ha-mcp (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv?

Update ha-mcp to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ha-mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv?

GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.2%, placing it in the 8th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv?

GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv is classified as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) (CWE-79). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv was published on March 12, 2026 and was last updated on March 14, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv

MEDIUM

ha-mcp has XSS via Unescaped HTML in OAuth Consent Form

Also known asCVE-2026-32112

Published

Mar 12, 2026

Updated

Mar 14, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk8th percentile+0.14%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍ha-mcp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The ha-mcp OAuth consent form renders user-controlled parameters via Python f-strings with no HTML escaping. An attacker who can reach the OAuth endpoint and convince the server operator to follow a crafted authorization URL could execute JavaScript in the operator's browser. This affects only users running the beta OAuth mode (ha-mcp-oauth), which is not part of the standard setup and requires explicit configuration.

Details

Unescaped f-string rendering

consent_form.py builds HTML using Python f-strings. No call to html.escape() exists anywhere in the file. The following values are rendered unescaped:

client_name / client_id — in HTML element context (lines 299, 303)
client_id, redirect_uri, state — in HTML attribute context (lines 310–312), where a " character breaks out of value=""
error_message, error, error_description — in error display paths (lines 36–40, 496–497)

An attacker can register a client with a malicious client_name via the /register (DCR) endpoint, which accepts client_name without sanitization. If the server operator then visits a crafted authorization URL for that client, the payload executes in their browser.

Open Dynamic Client Registration

DCR is enabled by default with no initial access token required. This is intentional: Claude.ai and ChatGPT must self-register on first use, which is the standard MCP OAuth flow (RFC 7591). Requiring a pre-shared token would break those integrations. Registration alone grants no access — authorization requires an explicit action by the server operator.

Impact

Affected configuration: OAuth mode only (ha-mcp-oauth, requires MCP_BASE_URL). This mode is in beta and is not included in the main setup documentation. The vast majority of ha-mcp users run stdio mode, which is not affected.

Attack requirements:

The attacker can reach the ha-mcp OAuth endpoint (it binds to 0.0.0.0 in HTTP mode)
The attacker registers a malicious client via /register
The attacker convinces the server operator — the person who set up ha-mcp — to follow a crafted authorization URL for an unrecognized application

Step 3 is a meaningful social engineering bar: the consent form displays the (unfamiliar) application name, and the operator has no legitimate reason to authorize an OAuth client they didn't initiate through Claude.ai or ChatGPT. Normal usage involves being redirected to the consent form from one of those platforms, not from an external link.

If exploited, a JavaScript payload could exfiltrate data entered into the consent form, including the Home Assistant Long-Lived Access Token.

Fix

Upgrade to 7.0.0

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`ha-mcp`	all versions	7.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ha-mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update ha-mcp to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The ha-mcp OAuth consent form renders user-controlled parameters via Python f-strings with no HTML escaping. An attacker who can reach the OAuth endpoint and convince the server operator to follow a crafted authorization URL could execute JavaScript in the operator's browser. This affects only users running the beta OAuth mode (`ha-mcp-oauth`), which is not part of the standard setup and requires explicit configuration. ### Details **Unescaped f-string rendering** `consent_form.py` builds HTML using Python f-strings. No call to `html.escape()` exists anywhere in the file. The f

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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