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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-p4xf-rf54-rj3x — pnpm

MEDIUM

GHSA-p4xf-rf54-rj3x is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.4) CWE-88 vulnerability in pnpm. A fix is available for pnpm — see the affected versions and patch details below.

pnpm: Git Fetch Argument Injection via Lockfile resolution.commit

Also known asCVE-2026-50014
Published
Jun 26, 2026
Updated
Jun 26, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-p4xf-rf54-rj3x.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs22th percentile — riskier than 22% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-p4xf-rf54-rj3x by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 379,842 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

400other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
pnpmnpm
212.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

pnpm passes the lockfile-controlled git resolution.commit value to git fetch without a -- separator or commit-format validation. For git dependencies fetched through the shallow-fetch path, a malicious lockfile can replace the expected 40-character commit hash with a Git option such as --upload-pack=<command>. For SSH and local transports, --upload-pack can execute the supplied command. HTTPS transports ignore --upload-pack, so the practical attack surface is primarily SSH or local git dependencies.

Vulnerability Details

The vulnerable path is in fetching/git-fetcher/src/index.ts. When a git dependency host is configured for shallow fetching, pnpm calls:

await execGit(['fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', resolution.commit], { cwd: tempLocation })

Because resolution.commit is appended before a -- separator, Git can parse a commit value beginning with - as an option. The same file later passes the value to git checkout without a separator:

await execGit(['checkout', resolution.commit], { cwd: tempLocation })

resolution.commit comes from the lockfile and is typed as a plain string; pnpm does not validate it as a 40-character hexadecimal commit before passing it to Git.

Proof of Concept

bash autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln11_git_upload_pack_rce/exploit.sh
# Creates a local bare git repo and triggers the shallow-fetch path.
# Replaces the lockfile commit hash with '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/vuln11_pwned'.
# Result: PASS -- /tmp/vuln11_pwned created by injected touch command.

The PoC uses a local file://githost/... repository because the injection requires a local or SSH transport. HTTPS transport ignores --upload-pack.

Impact

Code execution as the user running pnpm install, under specific transport conditions. The attacker must modify pnpm-lock.yaml, and the affected dependency must use SSH or local git transport. HTTPS transport (the common case) is immune.

Suggested Remediation

Add a -- separator before lockfile-controlled git revision values. Validate resolution.commit matches /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/i before passing to Git.


Discovered by AutoFyn Full audit report: audit_report.md Exploit script: exploit.sh

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmpnpmall versions10.34.0npm install pnpm@10.34.0
📦npmpnpm≥ 11.0.0&&< 11.4.011.4.0npm install pnpm@11.4.0

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
pnpmpnpm
≥ 11.0.0 && < 11.4.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pnpm to 10.34.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p4xf-rf54-rj3x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

This Moderate severity flaw in pnpm allows for arbitrary code execution. The vulnerability arises from pnpm's improper handling of git dependency commit values from a malicious lockfile, specifically when using SSH or local git transports. Red Hat products utilizing pnpm, such as Konflux, Red Hat Build of Keycloak,…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-p4xf-rf54-rj3x (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary pnpm passes the lockfile-controlled git `resolution.commit` value to `git fetch` without a `--` separator or commit-format validation. For git dependencies fetched through the shallow-fetch path, a malicious lockfile can replace the expected 40-character commit hash with a Git option such as `--upload-pack=<command>`. For SSH and local transports, `--upload-pack` can execute the supplied command. HTTPS transports ignore `--upload-pack`, so the practical attack surface is primarily SSH or local git dependencies. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerable path is in `fetching/git-fetc
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-p4xf-rf54-rj3x: pnpm (Medium 6.4) | O3 Security