How severe is GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj?

GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj has a CVSS score of 5.3/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj?

GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj affects the following packages: github.com/envoyproxy/gateway (Go), github.com/envoyproxy/gateway (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj?

Update github.com/envoyproxy/gateway to 1.2.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/envoyproxy/gateway. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj?

GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 18th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj?

GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj is classified as CWE-117 (CWE-117). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj was published on March 6, 2025 and was last updated on February 4, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj

MEDIUM

Envoy Gateway Log Injection Vulnerability

Also known asBIT-envoy-gateway-2025-25294CVE-2025-25294GO-2025-3504

Published

Mar 6, 2025

Updated

Feb 4, 2026

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

2 / 2

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk18th percentile-0.09%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/envoyproxy/gateway🐹github.com/envoyproxy/gateway

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

In all Envoy Gateway versions prior to 1.2.7 and 1.3.1 a default Envoy Proxy access log configuration is used. This format is vulnerable to log injection attacks.

If the attacker uses a specially crafted user-agent which performs json injection, then he could add and overwrite fields to the access log.

Examples of attacks include:

Using following string as user agent : HELLO-WORLD", "evil-ip": "1.1.1.1", "x-forwarded-for": "1.1.1.1 would lead to setting of new access log properties and overwrite of existing properties. Existing properties such as the value of the X-Forwarded-For header may have importance for security analysis of access logs, and their overwrite can be used to hide malicious activity.
Using the following string as user-agent : " which renders an invalid json document. The invalid document may fail to be processed by observability solutions, which would allow attacker to hide malicious activity.

Patches

1.3.1, 1.2.7

Fix

Using JSON format as the default format for access logs. The logged document will contain the same key and values as before. Only the order of properties is different inside the logged document.

Workaround

One can overwrite the old text based default format with JSON formatter by setting the following property: "EnvoyProxy.spec.telemetry.accessLog" to

settings:
- format:
    type: JSON
    json:
      start_time: '%START_TIME%'
      method: '%REQ(:METHOD)%'
      x-envoy-origin-path: '%REQ(X-ENVOY-ORIGINAL-PATH?:PATH)%'
      protocol: '%PROTOCOL%'
      response_code: '%RESPONSE_CODE%'
      response_flags: '%RESPONSE_FLAGS%'
      response_code_details: '%RESPONSE_CODE_DETAILS%'
      connection_termination_details: '%CONNECTION_TERMINATION_DETAILS%'
      upstream_transport_failure_reason: '%UPSTREAM_TRANSPORT_FAILURE_REASON%'
      bytes_received: '%BYTES_RECEIVED%'
      bytes_sent: '%BYTES_SENT%'
      duration: '%DURATION%'
      x-envoy-upstream-service-time: '%RESP(X-ENVOY-UPSTREAM-SERVICE-TIME)%'
      x-forwarded-for: '%REQ(X-FORWARDED-FOR)%'
      user-agent: '%REQ(USER-AGENT)%'
      x-request-id: '%REQ(X-REQUEST-ID)%'
      :authority: '%REQ(:AUTHORITY)%'
      upstream_host: '%UPSTREAM_HOST%'
      upstream_cluster: '%UPSTREAM_CLUSTER%'
      upstream_local_address: '%UPSTREAM_LOCAL_ADDRESS%'
      downstream_local_address: '%DOWNSTREAM_LOCAL_ADDRESS%'
      downstream_remote_address: '%DOWNSTREAM_REMOTE_ADDRESS%'
      requested_server_name: '%REQUESTED_SERVER_NAME%'
      route_name: '%ROUTE_NAME%'

see API definition here

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/envoyproxy/gateway`	all versions	1.2.7
🐹Go	`github.com/envoyproxy/gateway`	≥ 1.3.0-rc.1&&< 1.3.1	1.3.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/envoyproxy/gateway. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/envoyproxy/gateway to 1.2.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact In all Envoy Gateway versions prior to 1.2.7 and 1.3.1 a default Envoy Proxy access log configuration is used. This format is vulnerable to log injection attacks. If the attacker uses a specially crafted user-agent which performs json injection, then he could add and overwrite fields to the access log. Examples of attacks include: - Using following string as user agent : `HELLO-WORLD", "evil-ip": "1.1.1.1", "x-forwarded-for": "1.1.1.1` would lead to setting of new access log properties and overwrite of existing properties. Existing properties such as the value of the X-Forward

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-mf24-chxh-hmvj across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works