ouroboros-ai: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-47211: untrusted project .env can still reach RCE via omitted execution-routing keysGHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w
GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w is a CWE-15 vulnerability in ouroboros-ai. A fix is available for ouroboros-ai — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
ouroboros-aiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
The CVE-2026-47211 fix (0.39.0) added _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST to stop an untrusted project-directory .env from redirecting execution. The denylist was incomplete — several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a .env (auto-loaded at import, no review step):
- Backend config-home roots
CODEX_HOME,OPENCODE_CONFIG,OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR,XDG_CONFIG_HOME: a spawned vendor CLI resolves its config from these.CODEX_HOME=./.evil+ committed./.evil/config.tomlredirects the nested Codex agent to attacker config —mcp_servers.<name>.command/args(RCE) andapproval_policy="never"/sandbox_mode="danger-full-access"(silent removal of the human approval gate). (reported by matte1782) - MCP bridge / plugin execution roster
OUROBOROS_MCP_CONFIG(the YAML's servercommand/argsare spawned via stdio_client — RCE),OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_LOCKFILE,OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_TRUST_ROOT(redirect the installed-plugin roster / trust root soooo <name>dispatches into attacker code). (reported by hackkim) - SSRF guard toggle
OUROBOROS_ALLOW_LOCAL_TRANSPORT(re-enables loopback/private MCP transport targets). - Instruction / capability roots
OUROBOROS_AGENTS_DIR,COPILOT_CUSTOM_INSTRUCTIONS_DIRS(replace spawned sub-agent role prompts),OUROBOROS_RUNTIME_PROFILE(backend selector),OUROBOROS_TOOL_CAPABILITIES(override YAML can lower a tool'sapproval_class, weakening the approval gate).
Additionally, the MCP bridge auto-loaded ./.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml from the working directory (create_bridge_from_env(cwd=Path.cwd())), so running ooo inside a malicious repo spawned the committed roster's command — RCE with no .env at all. (cwd-branch noted by hackkim)
Patches
Fixed in 0.42.1. All listed keys were added to _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST; the cwd auto-discovery branch was removed (only the explicit OUROBOROS_MCP_CONFIG env var and ~/.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml remain, both trusted). The regression suite now derives from the source denylist to prevent future drift.
Workarounds
Do not run Ouroboros from an untrusted/cloned repository directory; remove any project-directory .env and ./.ouroboros/mcp_servers.yaml before running.
Credit
Reported privately via coordinated disclosure by matte1782 and hackkim (https://github.com/hackkim).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | ouroboros-ai | all versions | 0.42.1pip install --upgrade 'ouroboros-ai==0.42.1' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ouroboros-ai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update ouroboros-ai to 0.42.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.