GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh is a high-severity (CVSS 7.4) Missing Authentication vulnerability in @budibase/server. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Budibase: Unauthenticated S3 signed upload URL generation allows arbitrary writes with stored datasource credentials
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@budibase/servernpmDescription
The application server exposes an unauthenticated endpoint that generates S3 PutObject presigned URLs using credentials stored in a workspace datasource. The route is protected only by the recaptcha middleware and does not require authentication, table permission, datasource permission, or builder access. A public caller who knows a workspace ID and S3 datasource ID can request a signed upload URL for attacker-controlled bucket and key values.
Details
The static route registers the signed upload URL endpoint with only recaptcha before the controller:
packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:44-48
44: .post(
45: "/api/attachments/:datasourceId/url",
46: recaptcha,
47: controller.getSignedUploadURL
48: )
The controller loads the datasource by datasourceId with enriched secret values:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:590-598
590:export const getSignedUploadURL = async function (
591: ctx: Ctx<GetSignedUploadUrlRequest, GetSignedUploadUrlResponse>
592:) {
593: // Ensure datasource is valid
594: let datasource
595: try {
596: const { datasourceId } = ctx.params
597: datasource = await sdk.datasources.get(datasourceId, { enriched: true })
598: if (!datasource) {
The request body controls bucket and key, and the server signs a PUT URL using the stored datasource credentials:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:609-629
609: if (datasource?.source === "S3") {
610: const { bucket, key } = ctx.request.body || {}
611: if (!bucket || !key) {
612: ctx.throw(400, "bucket and key values are required")
613: }
614: try {
615: let endpoint = datasource?.config?.endpoint
616: if (endpoint && !utils.urlHasProtocol(endpoint)) {
617: endpoint = `https://${endpoint}`
618: }
619: const s3 = new S3({
620: region: awsRegion,
621: endpoint: endpoint,
622: credentials: {
623: accessKeyId: datasource?.config?.accessKeyId as string,
624: secretAccessKey: datasource?.config?.secretAccessKey as string,
625: },
626: })
627: const params = { Bucket: bucket, Key: key }
628: signedUrl = await getSignedUrl(s3, new PutObjectCommand(params))
629: if (endpoint) {
The endpoint returns the signed URL and public URL to the caller:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:630-639
630: publicUrl = `${endpoint}/${bucket}/${key}`
631: } else {
632: publicUrl = `https://${bucket}.s3.${awsRegion}.amazonaws.com/${key}`
633: }
634: } catch (error: any) {
635: ctx.throw(400, error)
636: }
637: }
638:
639: ctx.body = { signedUrl, publicUrl }
Because no authorization middleware is applied, the API trusts public input to choose where the stored S3 credentials will write.
PoC
Non-destructive validation approach:
- Create or identify a workspace with an S3 datasource.
- Obtain the production workspace ID and S3 datasource ID.
- Send an unauthenticated request with the workspace ID header and attacker-controlled bucket/key:
POST /api/attachments/<datasourceId>/url HTTP/1.1
x-budibase-app-id: app_<workspace-id>
content-type: application/json
{"bucket":"attacker-controlled-or-permitted-bucket","key":"poc/budibase.txt"}
- Observe that the response contains a signed PUT URL.
- Upload harmless content to the returned
signedUrland confirm the object is created using the datasource's stored S3 credentials.
Impact
This allows unauthenticated arbitrary object writes wherever the stored S3 datasource credentials have PutObject access. Depending on the datasource permissions, this can corrupt application data, overwrite public assets, place attacker-controlled objects in trusted buckets, consume storage, or abuse an organization's cloud credentials.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @budibase/server | all versions | 3.39.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @budibase/server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @budibase/server to 3.39.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.