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CVE-2026-35219

CVE-2026-35219 is a security vulnerability in @budibase/server. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-35219 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist

Published
Aug 14, 2026
Updated
Aug 14, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 14, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

1other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@budibase/servernpm
15Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLIST_IPS is not configured.

Vulnerable Code

Automation Steps (No Blacklist)

All automation steps use fetch() directly without any IP validation:

packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts line 69:

const response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts line 34:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts line 53:

response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts line 20:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts line 29:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)

packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts line 684:

if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {
  throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.")
}

But BLACKLIST_IPS env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:

packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts lines 39-45:

if (blackListArray?.length === 0) {
  return false  // Always passes when no IPs configured
}

Impact

  • Automation steps: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module
  • REST API: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection.
  • Cloud metadata: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ accessible via any automation step
  • Internal services: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs

Remediation

  1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps
  2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
  3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct fetch() calls
  4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@budibase/serverall versions3.41.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @budibase/server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @budibase/server to 3.41.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-35219 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-35219 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-35219. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using `node-fetch` directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when `BLACKLIST_IPS` is not configured. ## Vulnerable Code ### Automation Steps (No Blacklist) All automation steps use `fetch()` directly without any IP validation: **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` line 69:** ```typescript const response
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-35219 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-35219 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.