GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.6) SQL Injection vulnerability in @budibase/server. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Budibase: MySQL DESCRIBE Backtick Injection via multipleStatements in Database Connector
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 368,634 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@budibase/servernpmDescription
Summary
This is a related but independently fixable vulnerability to GHSA-qqf5-x7mj-v43p (PostgreSQL SQL injection), reported in the same original disclosure and split per GitHub CNA guidance (rule 4.2.11) since it affects a separate integration, has a distinct attack precondition, and requires a separate patch.
The MySQL integration enables multipleStatements: true on the connection,
permitting semicolon-separated multi-statement execution. During table
introspection, table names retrieved from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES are
interpolated into a DESCRIBE query wrapped in backticks, but embedded
backticks in the table name are never escaped — allowing a malicious table
name to break out and inject a second, attacker-controlled statement.
Details
Vulnerable Code:
File: packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts, lines 172, 305
this.config = { ...config, multipleStatements: true, ... } // line 172
...
{ sql: `DESCRIBE \`${tableName}\`;` } // line 305 — backtick NOT escaped
Because multipleStatements is enabled, any statement appended after the
backtick break-out executes as a second query in the same round trip.
Step-by-Step Reproduction
- An attacker with the ability to create tables in the target MySQL
database (e.g. a lower-privileged database user, or a malicious actor in
a multi-tenant database) creates a table named:
foo`; DROP TABLE users; -- - In Budibase, an administrator triggers schema introspection for that database (e.g. opening the datasource or refreshing its table list).
- Budibase reads the malicious table name from
INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLESand interpolates it into theDESCRIBEquery. - The unescaped backtick terminates the identifier early, and the
semicolon-separated payload (enabled by
multipleStatements: true) executes as a second statement.
Impact
Arbitrary SQL execution triggered during routine schema discovery. Unlike the PostgreSQL and MS SQL Server findings, this does not require the attacker to control the Budibase datasource configuration directly — only the ability to create a maliciously named table in the underlying database beforehand, with an administrator's normal use of the introspection feature serving as the trigger.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @budibase/server | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @budibase/server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of @budibase/server has shipped for GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2xgg-r2wc-c5r2 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.