How severe is GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7?

GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 affects the following packages: @budibase/server (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7?

Update @budibase/server to 3.41.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @budibase/server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7?

O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Is GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7?

GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 19th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7?

GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 is classified as Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (CWE-918). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 was published on August 14, 2026 and was last updated on August 14, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 — @budibase/server

GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in @budibase/server. A fix is available for @budibase/server — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist

Also known asCVE-2026-35219

Published

Aug 14, 2026

Updated

Aug 14, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Sep 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs19th percentile — riskier than 19% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

1other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream

@budibase/servernpm

5Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLIST_IPS is not configured.

Vulnerable Code

Automation Steps (No Blacklist)

All automation steps use fetch() directly without any IP validation:

packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts line 69:

const response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts line 34:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts line 53:

response = await fetch(url, request)  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts line 20:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts line 29:

response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...})  // No blacklist check

REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)

packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts line 684:

if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {
  throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.")
}

But BLACKLIST_IPS env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:

packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts lines 39-45:

if (blackListArray?.length === 0) {
  return false  // Always passes when no IPs configured
}

Impact

Automation steps: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module
REST API: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection.
Cloud metadata: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ accessible via any automation step
Internal services: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs

Remediation

Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps
Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct fetch() calls
SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`@budibase/server`	all versions	3.41.3`npm install @budibase/server@3.41.3`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @budibase/server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @budibase/server to 3.41.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using `node-fetch` directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when `BLACKLIST_IPS` is not configured. ## Vulnerable Code ### Automation Steps (No Blacklist) All automation steps use `fetch()` directly without any IP validation: **`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` line 69:** ```typescript const response

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works