How severe is GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q?

GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q affects the following packages: code.gitea.io/gitea (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q?

Update code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.27.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.gitea.io/gitea, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Is GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q?

GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.5%, placing it in the 38th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q?

GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q is classified as Information Exposure (CWE-200), CWE-862 (CWE-862). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q was published on July 21, 2026 and was last updated on July 27, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q — gitea

Fix: go-gitea/gitea#38321

GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q is a Information Exposure vulnerability in code.gitea.io/gitea. A fix is available for code.gitea.io/gitea — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation

Also known asCVE-2026-58434GO-2026-6062

Published

Jul 21, 2026

Updated

Jul 27, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Sep 29, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs38th percentile — riskier than 38% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹code.gitea.io/gitea

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A user who previously had access to a private repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through GET /api/v1/user/starred after their access to the repository has been revoked.

After a collaborator is removed from a private repository, direct access to the repository is correctly denied. However, the repository may still appear in the user's starred repository list, and the endpoint continues to return repository metadata. Changes made to that metadata after access revocation are also reflected in subsequent responses.

Details

The issue affects the authenticated endpoint:

GET /api/v1/user/starred

The same behavior was also observed on:

GET /api/v1/user/subscriptions

A reproducible scenario is:

User alice creates a private repository.
User bob is granted collaborator access.
bob stars the repository.
alice removes bob from the repository collaborators.
Direct repository access by bob is denied.
bob requests /api/v1/user/starred.
The repository is still present in the response together with repository metadata.

Additionally, if repository metadata is modified after access revocation, the updated values are returned by /api/v1/user/starred.

As a result, a user who no longer has permission to access the repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through the starred repository list.

PoC

PoC Link

https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Gitea_PoC-EC93/5_poc_starred_list

PoC Details

Create a private repository:

alice/P
description = "INITIAL"

Add bob as a collaborator with read access.
As bob, star the repository:

PUT /api/v1/user/starred/alice/P

Response:

204 No Content

Remove bob from the collaborator list.
Update the repository description:

description = "AFTER-REVOKE"

Verify that direct repository access is no longer allowed:

GET /api/v1/repos/alice/P

Response:

404 Not Found

As bob, request the starred repository list:

GET /api/v1/user/starred

The response still contains the repository entry and reflects the updated description:

{
  "full_name": "alice/P",
  "description": "AFTER-REVOKE",
  "private": true
}

This demonstrates that repository metadata remains accessible through the starred repository list even after repository access has been revoked.

Impact

A user who previously had legitimate access to a private repository can continue to retrieve repository metadata after losing access to the repository.

The exposed information includes repository metadata returned by the endpoint, such as:

Repository name (full_name)
Repository description
Repository visibility status (private)

This issue does not expose repository contents, source code, issues, pull requests, secrets, or collaborator information.

The impact is limited to continued access to repository metadata after repository permissions have been revoked.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`code.gitea.io/gitea`	all versions	1.27.0`go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.gitea.io/gitea, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.27.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A user who previously had access to a private repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through `GET /api/v1/user/starred` after their access to the repository has been revoked. After a collaborator is removed from a private repository, direct access to the repository is correctly denied. However, the repository may still appear in the user's starred repository list, and the endpoint continues to return repository metadata. Changes made to that metadata after access revocation are also reflected in subsequent responses. ### Details The issue affects the authenticate

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