GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p
MEDIUMGHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) vulnerability in surrealdb. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via graph and reference traversals
Blast Radius
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Description
A record user could read field values hidden from them by field-level SELECT permissions by reaching the records through a graph-edge (->) or back-reference (<~) traversal instead of a direct SELECT.
When a table was readable at the table level but carried a field hidden by a field-level permission (DEFINE FIELD secret ON knows PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE), a direct SELECT * FROM knows hid secret — but reaching the same records through a traversal that yields full objects — person:bob->(SELECT * FROM knows), person:bob<~(SELECT * FROM comment), or a projected target vertex ->knows->(SELECT * FROM person) — returned it intact.
The root cause: the shared resolve_record_batch helper used by GraphEdgeScan (FullEdge) and ReferenceScan (FullRecord) enforced only the table-level SELECT permission and pushed raw record data, never running the field-level filtering (build_field_state / filter_fields_by_permission) that ordinary table scans and fetch_record apply.
Impact
A record user can read the values of fields hidden by field-level SELECT permissions, on tables they already hold table-level SELECT on, by materialising the records through a graph-edge, back-reference, or target-vertex traversal — recovering the values directly, for every record the traversal returns.
The disclosure is confined to the field-permission layer: it grants no unauthorised cross-table, cross-record, or cross-namespace/database access. The table's own SELECT permission — including any row-level WHERE predicate — is still enforced, so the caller only reaches records they were already entitled to read; only the per-field SELECT filtering within those records is skipped. Root and record-owner sessions are unaffected, and data cannot be modified (confidentiality only).
Table-level enforcement on these traversals landed in 3.1.0 (the fix for GHSA-vjjx-rfw4-rmfc); releases before 3.1.0 additionally exposed whole records on tables the caller could not read, and are covered by that advisory.
Patches
resolve_record_batch (the shared helper that materialises full records for graph and reference traversals) now applies field-level SELECT permissions and read-time COMPUTED fields to each record, matching the regular table-scan and fetch_record paths.
Versions 3.1.5 and later are not affected.
Workarounds
- Force the unaffected legacy executor with
--planner-strategy compute-only(envSURREAL_PLANNER_STRATEGY). - Do not rely on field-level SELECT permissions to hide values on tables reachable as a graph edge, reference target, or traversal vertex; restrict at the table level instead.
- Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.
References
- SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE FIELD
- SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS
- SurrealQL Documentation — Graph relationships
fix(exec): apply field-level SELECT permissions + computed fields when graph/reference traversals materialize full records
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | surrealdb | ≥ 3.1.0&&< 3.1.5 | 3.1.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update surrealdb to 3.1.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.