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MEDIUM severity

Envoy Gateway: OCI layer extraction allocates make([]byte, h.Size) from untrusted tar headerGHSA-h7pq-86h8-rp5x

MEDIUM

GHSA-h7pq-86h8-rp5x is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-789 vulnerability in github.com/envoyproxy/gateway. A fix is available for github.com/envoyproxy/gateway — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asBIT-envoy-gateway-2026-53717CVE-2026-53717GO-2026-6008
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-h7pq-86h8-rp5x.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs53th percentile — riskier than 53% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.21%0.55%0.88%1.22%0.7%0.7%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-h7pq-86h8-rp5x by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/envoyproxy/gateway🐹github.com/envoyproxy/gateway

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Envoy Gateway is an open source project for managing Envoy Proxy as a standalone or Kubernetes-based application gateway. Prior to 1.7.4 and 1.8.1, internal/wasm/imagefetcher.go follows tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy spec.wasm[].code.image.url values to Docker or OCI Wasm layers, and extractWasmPluginBinary uses the untrusted tar-header h.Size value to allocate memory before validating the entry name or declared size. A small PAX or GNU tar header can therefore claim a multi-terabyte entry even though the surrounding LimitReader restricts only the bytes read from the stream, and no registry allowlist prevents a permitted tenant from selecting an attacker-controlled registry that the controller can reach. The allocation is attempted for every tar entry and can cause an unrecoverable Go runtime out-of-memory failure; because the custom resource persists, reconciliation repeatedly crash-loops the shared controller and causes a single-request, non-volumetric, cluster-wide control-plane denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.4 and 1.8.1.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/envoyproxy/gateway≥ 1.8.0-rc.0&&< 1.8.11.8.1go get github.com/envoyproxy/gateway@v1.8.1
🐹Gogithub.com/envoyproxy/gatewayall versions1.7.4go get github.com/envoyproxy/gateway@v1.7.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/envoyproxy/gateway, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/envoyproxy/gateway to 1.8.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h7pq-86h8-rp5x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete. **Preconditions (4):** - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Controller has egress to attacker-controlled OCI registry - No registry allowlist (none exists in code) - Layer presents Docker/OCI media type **Description** At imagefetcher.go:287, make([]byte, h.Size) uses the attacker-controlled tar-header size; the LimitReader at :278 bounds bytes read from the stream but not the header-declared size returned by tr.Next() (a 512-byte header can claim a multi-TB entry via PAX/GNU e
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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