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GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw

MEDIUM

GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.1) Path Traversal vulnerability in kimai/kimai. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Kimai has an arbitrary file read in its invoice PDF renderer (admin)

Also known asCVE-2026-44298
Published
May 8, 2026
Updated
May 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘kimai/kimai

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Users with the role System-Admin (ROLE_SYSTE_ADMIN) and the permission upload_invoice_template can upload PDF invoice templates, which can call pdfContext.setOption('associated_files', ...) inside the sandboxed Twig render.

This is forwarded to mPDF's SetAssociatedFiles(), whose writer calls file_get_contents($entry['path']) during PDF output and embeds the bytes as a FlateDecode stream in the PDF. Any file readable by the PHP worker is returned to the attacker inside the rendered invoice.

Root cause

  1. src/Twig/SecurityPolicy/StrictPolicy.php:123-128 explicitly whitelists PdfContext::setOption():

    if ($obj instanceof PdfContext) {
        if ($lcm !== 'setoption') { throw ...; }
        return;
    }
    
  2. src/Pdf/MPdfConverter.php keeps associated_files in the pass-through allowlist:

    $allowed = ['mode','format','default_font_size','default_font', ... , 'associated_files','additional_xmp_rdf'];
    

    and then forwards it to mPDF:

    if (array_key_exists('associated_files', $options) && is_array($options['associated_files'])) {
        $associatedFiles = $options['associated_files'];
        unset($options['associated_files']);
    }
    ...
    $mpdf->SetAssociatedFiles($associatedFiles);
    
  3. mPDF 8.3.1 MetadataWriter::writeAssociatedFiles() calls file_get_contents, which respects PHP stream wrappers:

    if (isset($file['path'])) {
        $fileContent = @file_get_contents($file['path']);
    }
    ...
    $filestream = gzcompress($fileContent);
    $this->writer->write('<</Type /EmbeddedFile');
    

The sandbox and the option allowlist were both written defensively (short whitelists, not blacklists), but neither side considered that associated_files is a PDF/A file-embedding feature whose path key is a sink.

Fix

The implemented fix has two aspects:

  1. The PdfContext now works with a strict allow-list, that excludes associated_files
  2. The MPdfConverter now removes any path from the $associatedFiles array, which can still be used by plugins:
        if (\count($associatedFiles) > 0) {
            // remove "path" so mPDF will not use file_get_contents() on local files
            // callers must pre-read and pass the bytes via "content"
            $associatedFiles = array_map(static function ($entry): array {
                if (!\is_array($entry)) {
                    return [];
                }

                if (\array_key_exists('path', $entry)) {
                    unset($entry['path']);
                }

                return $entry;
            }, $associatedFiles);
            $mpdf->SetAssociatedFiles($associatedFiles);
        }

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistkimai/kimai2.32.0&&< 2.562.56

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for kimai/kimai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update kimai/kimai to 2.56 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Users with the role `System-Admin` (`ROLE_SYSTE_ADMIN`) and the permission `upload_invoice_template` can upload PDF invoice templates, which can call `pdfContext.setOption('associated_files', ...)` inside the sandboxed Twig render. This is forwarded to mPDF's `SetAssociatedFiles()`, whose writer calls `file_get_contents($entry['path'])` during PDF output and embeds the bytes as a FlateDecode stream in the PDF. Any file readable by the PHP worker is returned to the attacker inside the rendered invoice. ## Root cause 1. `src/Twig/SecurityPolicy/StrictPolicy.php:123-128` explicitl
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-h5fh-7hwr-97mw across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.