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GHSA-gh4h-34gr-87r7

MEDIUM

Budibase: OAuth2 Token Disclosure via Automation Test Results Broadcast to Other Builders

Published
Jul 24, 2026
Updated
Jul 24, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@budibase/servernpm
5Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

When an SSO-authenticated user tests an automation in the Budibase builder, their OAuth2 access token and refresh token are included in the automation test results. These results are broadcast via WebSocket to all builders connected to the same dev app and stored in an in-memory cache accessible to any builder who polls the test status endpoint. This allows any co-builder of the same app to steal the testing user's OAuth2 tokens.

Details

The vulnerability exists because getUserContextBindings() intentionally includes OAuth2 tokens in user context bindings (so automations can call external APIs), but the automation test pipeline exposes the full result — including these tokens — to all builders of the same app without sanitization.

Step 1: Tokens included in user bindings

In packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:134-161:

export function getUserContextBindings(user: ContextUser): UserBindings {
  const bindings: UserBindings = {
    _id: user._id,
    email: user.email,
    // ...
  }
  if (isSSOUser(user) && user.oauth2) {
    bindings.oauth2 = {
      accessToken: user.oauth2.accessToken,   // <-- sensitive
      refreshToken: user.oauth2.refreshToken,  // <-- sensitive
    }
  }
  return bindings
}

Step 2: Bindings passed to automation execution

In packages/server/src/api/controllers/automation.ts:311-312:

const user = sdk.users.getUserContextBindings(ctx.user)
return await triggers.externalTrigger(
  { ...automation, disabled: false },
  { ...input, appId, user },  // user with tokens passed as event param
  { getResponses: true, onProgress: emitProgress }
)

Step 3: Tokens placed in trigger outputs

In packages/server/src/threads/automation.ts:409-413:

const trigger: AutomationTriggerResult = {
  id: data.automation.definition.trigger.id,
  stepId: data.automation.definition.trigger.stepId,
  inputs: null,
  outputs: data.event,  // data.event includes user.oauth2 tokens
}

Step 4: Result broadcast without sanitization

The full result (including trigger.outputs.user.oauth2) is exposed via two vectors:

  1. WebSocket broadcastbuilderSocket.emitToRoom() calls this.io.in(room).emit() (packages/server/src/websockets/websocket.ts:291) which sends to ALL sockets in the app's room, not just the originator.

  2. Test status endpointrecordTestProgress() stores the result in a Map keyed by ${appId}:${automationId} with no user isolation (packages/server/src/automations/testProgress.ts:41-74). Any builder can call GET /api/automations/:id/test/status to retrieve another user's test results.

PoC

Requires two builder-level users on the same Budibase app, where User A authenticates via SSO/OIDC (Google, Azure AD, etc.) which provides OAuth2 tokens.

# Step 1: User A (SSO-authenticated builder) tests an automation asynchronously
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/automations/<automation-id>/test?async=true \
  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_<appid>' \
  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<userA_session>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"row": {"tableId": "ta_xxx"}}'
# Returns: {"message": "Automation test started"}

# Step 2: User B (another builder on the same app) polls the test status
curl -X GET http://localhost:10000/api/automations/<automation-id>/test/status \
  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_<appid>' \
  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<userB_session>'

# Response includes the full automation result with:
# result.trigger.outputs.user.oauth2.accessToken = "ya29.a0AfH6SM..."
# result.trigger.outputs.user.oauth2.refreshToken = "1//0eXyz..."

Additionally, User B can passively receive the tokens by simply having the Budibase builder open (connected via WebSocket), as the BuilderSocketEvent.AutomationTestProgress event with status: "complete" includes the full result payload.

Impact

  • OAuth2 access tokens for external services (Google Workspace, Azure AD, GitHub, etc.) are exposed to co-builders of the same app. These tokens can be used to access external APIs as the victim user.
  • OAuth2 refresh tokens provide persistent access — an attacker can generate new access tokens even after the original expires, maintaining long-term access to the victim's external service accounts.
  • The attack is passive via WebSocket — an attacker only needs to have the builder UI open to receive tokens when any co-builder tests an automation.
  • Test results persist in memory for 5 minutes (TTL in testProgress.ts:15), providing a window for polling-based attacks.

Recommended Fix

Strip OAuth2 tokens from automation test results before storing/broadcasting them. The tokens are needed during automation execution but should not be included in the result sent to clients.

In packages/server/src/api/controllers/automation.ts, sanitize the result before passing to emitProgress:

function sanitizeAutomationResult(result: AutomationResults): AutomationResults {
  const sanitized = cloneDeep(result)
  if (sanitized.trigger?.outputs?.user?.oauth2) {
    delete sanitized.trigger.outputs.user.oauth2
  }
  for (const step of sanitized.steps || []) {
    if (step.outputs?.user?.oauth2) {
      delete step.outputs.user.oauth2
    }
  }
  return sanitized
}

Apply sanitization in the emitProgress callback at line 290 and before returning ctx.body at line 342:

emitProgress({
  status: "complete",
  occurredAt: Date.now(),
  result: sanitizeAutomationResult(result),
})

Additionally, the testProgress store should be scoped per-user (keyed by ${appId}:${automationId}:${userId}) so that one builder's test results are not accessible to another builder via the testStatus endpoint.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@budibase/serverall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @budibase/server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of @budibase/server has shipped for GHSA-gh4h-34gr-87r7 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gh4h-34gr-87r7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-gh4h-34gr-87r7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary When an SSO-authenticated user tests an automation in the Budibase builder, their OAuth2 access token and refresh token are included in the automation test results. These results are broadcast via WebSocket to all builders connected to the same dev app and stored in an in-memory cache accessible to any builder who polls the test status endpoint. This allows any co-builder of the same app to steal the testing user's OAuth2 tokens. ## Details The vulnerability exists because `getUserContextBindings()` intentionally includes OAuth2 tokens in user context bindings (so automations can
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-gh4h-34gr-87r7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-gh4h-34gr-87r7 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.