GHSA-g9g6-qhrc-p3qc
Fix: go-gitea/gitea#38009GHSA-g9g6-qhrc-p3qc is a CWE-284 vulnerability in code.gitea.io/gitea. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-g9g6-qhrc-p3qc is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Gitea: Improper authorization on OAuth sign-in callback silently re-enables administrator-disabled accounts
Real-World Exposure
code.gitea.io/giteaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The OAuth2 sign-in callback in Gitea 1.26.1 unconditionally re-enables a locally-disabled account whenever the user authenticates through a linked external identity provider, silently undoing any administrator-initiated Disable Account action and issuing a fresh authenticated session in the same response. Once a user has linked any external IdP, the administrator's disable toggle becomes non-binding — the user can re-enable themselves on demand by completing one OAuth callback, regaining full read and write access to their repositories, organizations, and access tokens.
Details
Improper Authorization is present on the code and state parameters of the /user/oauth2/{source-name}/callback endpoint in Gitea version 1.26.1. The handler routers/web/auth/oauth.go::handleOAuth2SignIn reads the local user's IsActive flag at lines 350-352 and, when it is false, sets opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true) before calling user_service.UpdateUser and immediately establishing a session. The active-state precondition that the request middleware routers/web/web.go::verifyAuthWithOptions enforces for every other request is therefore evaluated against the freshly-flipped row on the next request, so a site administrator's "disable user" action is silently undone the next time the user authenticates through any linked external identity provider.
The root cause is that the callback path treats the local IsActive flag as stale bookkeeping to reconcile against the external identity, rather than as an authoritative administrative override. The local-credential sign-in path correctly renders IsErrUserInactive in the same condition; only the OAuth callback path flips the flag and proceeds.
PoC
- As a site administrator, configure an OAuth2 authentication source via
Site Administration -> Authentication Sources -> Add Authentication Source. Any external provider works (a self-hosted Keycloak, an upstream Gitea acting as OIDC, GitHub, GitLab, Microsoft, Google). - Have a normal user (
alicein the example) sign in through that source at least once. The callback creates the row inexternal_login_userlinking alice's local account to the IdP identity. - As the site administrator, disable alice's account:
Site Administration -> User Accounts -> alice -> "Disable Account". Confirm the flag is set with the admin API.
HTTP REQUEST
GET /api/v1/admin/users/alice HTTP/1.1
Host: <HOST>
Authorization: token <ADMIN_TOKEN>
Accept: application/json
HTTP RESPONSE
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8
{"id":2,"login":"alice","active":false,...}
- Have alice click "Sign in with <source-name>" on the Gitea login page and complete the OAuth dance with the IdP. The callback handler runs, observes
IsActive=false, setsopts.IsActive=true, callsUpdateUser, and issues a session on the same response. Alice lands on/. - Re-read the same admin API endpoint and observe that
activehas flipped back totruewithout administrator action.
HTTP REQUEST
GET /api/v1/admin/users/alice HTTP/1.1
Host: <HOST>
Authorization: token <ADMIN_TOKEN>
Accept: application/json
HTTP RESPONSE
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8
{"id":2,"login":"alice","active":true,...}
Impact
Once a user has linked any external identity provider, the site administrator's "disable user" toggle becomes non-binding on that account: the user can re-enable themselves on demand by completing one OAuth callback, regaining full read and write access to their repositories, organizations, and tokens. In SSO-fronted Gitea deployments where the disable toggle is the documented incident-response action for compromised accounts or departed employees, this defeats the only short-term remediation available before the identity provider can revoke the underlying federated identity.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | code.gitea.io/gitea | all versions | 1.26.4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.gitea.io/gitea. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.26.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g9g6-qhrc-p3qc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g9g6-qhrc-p3qc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-g9g6-qhrc-p3qc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-g9g6-qhrc-p3qc in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-g9g6-qhrc-p3qc across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.