GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692
Fix: kerberosmansour/hulumi#178GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692 is a CWE-697 vulnerability in @hulumi/policies. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
@hulumi/policies bypasses IAM-role policy checks when the role trusts multiple OIDC providers
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@hulumi/policiesnpmDescription
Affected: @hulumi/policies < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: High — CWE-697 (Incorrect Comparison)
Summary
AWS IAM trust policies can list more than one federated identity provider — for example, a role that accepts BOTH GitHub Actions OIDC and Google's OIDC. The G_OIDC_1 and G_OIDC_2 policy rules are supposed to flag IAM roles whose GitHub-OIDC trust is too permissive (e.g. wildcard sub: conditions that would let any branch or any pull request assume the role).
The bug: when the role's Principal.Federated field was a JSON array of multiple providers, the rules failed to recognise that GitHub Actions was one of them. The providers list was coerced into a single comma-joined string, the matcher only looked at the start, and the GitHub OIDC hostname was lost in the join. Both rules concluded "this isn't a GitHub-OIDC role" and skipped the wildcard check.
Impact
A trust policy that listed the real GitHub OIDC provider ARN alongside any second provider would slip past both detectors. Consumers using HulumiHardeningPack or HulumiGithubHardeningPack could ship an IAM role with wildcard sub: conditions (allowing untrusted PRs from forks to assume the role) while their policy validation reported the stack as compliant. The G_OIDC_2 detector also failed to mark such roles for the cluster-admin / AdministratorAccess blast-radius check.
Patches
Upgrade to @hulumi/[email protected]. The shared GitHub-OIDC-provider matcher now correctly walks lists of providers — if any element of the list is the real GitHub OIDC ARN, the role is treated as GitHub-OIDC-assumable and the wildcard / blast-radius checks apply.
Workarounds
None reliable — upgrade is the fix.
Resources
- PR #178 (Cluster A); regression tests at
packages/policies/tests/github/{g-oidc-2,github-oidc-issuer}.test.ts.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @hulumi/policies | all versions | 1.4.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @hulumi/policies. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @hulumi/policies to 1.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.