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CVE-2026-48033 — @hulumi/policies

Fix: kerberosmansour/hulumi#178

CVE-2026-48033 is a CWE-693 vulnerability in @hulumi/policies. A fix is available for @hulumi/policies — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Hulumi: Policy packs bypassed by a forged Pulumi-URN logical name

Also known asGHSA-rhgj-6g2c-frmm
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-48033.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs40th percentile — riskier than 40% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.33%0.65%0.98%0.3%0.3%0.5%0.5%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@hulumi/policiesnpm
40downloads / week

Description

Affected: @hulumi/policies < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: High — CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)

Summary

Pulumi gives every cloud resource a structured URN that includes the resource's type chain (hulumi:baseline:aws:SecureBucket$aws:s3/bucketV2:BucketV2) and the logical name the developer freely chose (anything after the final ::). Several Hulumi policy rules used the URN to grant exemptions — for example, "if this raw bucket is a child of SecureBucket, skip the raw-bucket rule because the parent component handles hardening."

The bug: the rules looked for a substring like hulumi:baseline:aws:SecureBucket$ anywhere in the URN. That substring can also appear in the developer-controlled logical-name portion. A developer (or compromised PR) could simply name a raw resource so its logical name carried the trusted substring, and every rule that used this check would treat the resource as if it were inside the trusted parent and skip its hardening check.

Codex reported this for DEPLOY_GOV_1; the same anti-pattern existed in five more packs (unreported but identically exploitable): AWS H4/H5 sibling lookups, GitHub H1, GitHub H2, Cloudflare CF_DNS_1, Cloudflare CF_DNSSEC_1, and (advisory-level) CIS v5 §2.1.1 + §2.1.5.

Impact

Consumers using @hulumi/policies could ship raw aws:s3:Bucket, github:Repository, cloudflare:Zone, cloudflare:DnsRecord, and similar resources that bypassed mandatory hardening checks by naming themselves with a trusted substring. Every affected rule appeared to pass while the resource had none of the expected defaults.

Patches

Upgrade to @hulumi/[email protected]. A new shared helper at packages/policies/src/urn.ts parses Pulumi URNs structurally and only looks for the trusted parent-type token inside the URN's type-chain segment — never inside the developer-controlled logical name. All six prior call sites have been migrated to it.

Workarounds

None reliable — a local lint that rejects logical names containing $ would catch the trivial form of the spoof but not crafted variants.

Resources

  • PR #178 (Cluster B); the URN-anchoring refactor and per-pack spoof-vector regression tests in packages/policies/tests/.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@hulumi/policiesall versions1.4.0npm install @hulumi/policies@1.4.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @hulumi/policies, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @hulumi/policies to 1.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-48033 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Affected:** `@hulumi/policies` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)** #### Summary Pulumi gives every cloud resource a structured URN that includes the resource's type chain (`hulumi:baseline:aws:SecureBucket$aws:s3/bucketV2:BucketV2`) and the _logical name_ the developer freely chose (anything after the final `::`). Several Hulumi policy rules used the URN to grant exemptions — for example, "if this raw bucket is a child of `SecureBucket`, skip the raw-bucket rule because the parent component handles hardening." The bug: the ru
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-48033: @hulumi/policies — Fixed in 1.4.0