Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm — v2

MEDIUM

GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in github.com/traefik/traefik/v2. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Traefik incorrectly processes fragment in the URL, leads to Authorization Bypass

Also known asCVE-2023-47106GO-2023-2376
Published
Dec 5, 2023
Updated
Aug 7, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs48th percentile — riskier than 48% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 379,842 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/traefik/traefik/v2🐹github.com/traefik/traefik/v3

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query.

When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions.

Details

For example, we have this Nginx configuration:

location /admin {
     deny all;
     return 403;
}

This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin

This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment.

However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become

/%23/../admin

And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy.

Here is a diagram to summarize the attack:

image

PoC

image (1)

This is the POC docker I've set up. It contains Nginx, Traefik proxies and a backend server running PHP.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vLnA0g7N7ZKhLNmHmuJ4JJjV_J2akNMt/view?usp=sharing

Impact

This allows the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from Front-End proxy.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v2all versions2.10.6go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v2@v2.10.6
🐹Gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v3all versions3.0.0-beta5go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v3@v3.0.0-beta5

Affected Products

1 product · 5 configurations
Application
traefiktraefik
≤ 2.10.5
1 version
3.0.0
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/traefik/traefik/v2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 to 2.10.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. ### Details For example, we have this Nginx configuration: ``` location /admin { deny all; return 403; } ``` This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin This wo
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm: v2 (Medium 6.5) | O3 Security