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GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm

MEDIUM

Traefik incorrectly processes fragment in the URL, leads to Authorization Bypass

Also known asCVE-2023-47106GO-2023-2376
Published
Dec 5, 2023
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk45th percentile+0.50%
0.00%0.38%0.75%1.13%0.1%0.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/traefik/traefik/v2🐹github.com/traefik/traefik/v3

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query.

When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions.

Details

For example, we have this Nginx configuration:

location /admin {
     deny all;
     return 403;
}

This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin

This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment.

However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become

/%23/../admin

And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy.

Here is a diagram to summarize the attack:

image

PoC

image (1)

This is the POC docker I've set up. It contains Nginx, Traefik proxies and a backend server running PHP.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vLnA0g7N7ZKhLNmHmuJ4JJjV_J2akNMt/view?usp=sharing

Impact

This allows the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from Front-End proxy.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v2all versions2.10.6
🐹Gogithub.com/traefik/traefik/v3all versions3.0.0-beta5
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/traefik/traefik/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 to 2.10.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. ### Details For example, we have this Nginx configuration: ``` location /admin { deny all; return 403; } ``` This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin This wo
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-fvhj-4qfh-q2hm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.