GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23
Fix: nats-io/nats-server#4605GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is a CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
NATS.io: Adding accounts for just the system account adds auth bypass
Real-World Exposure
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2🐹github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Background
NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.
NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable.
Problem Description
Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication.
Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block.
If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the no_auth_user account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules.
This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access.
But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled.
The blind-spot on our part came from encouraging and documenting a switch to using only "accounts", instead of "authorization".
In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the no_auth_user target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior.
Affected versions
NATS Server:
- 2.2.0 up to and including 2.9.22 and 2.10.1
- Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.10.2 and backported to 2.9.23
Workarounds
In the "accounts" block, define a second non-system account, leave it empty.
accounts {
SYS: {
users: [
{ user: sysuser, password: makemeasandwich }
]
}
DUMMY: {} # for security, before 2.10.2
}
system_account: SYS
Solution
Any one of these:
- Upgrade the NATS server to at least 2.10.2 (or 2.9.23)
- Or define a dummy account
- Or complete the migration of authorization entries to be inside a named account in the "accounts" block
Credits
Problem reported by Alex Herrington.
Addressed publicly in a GitHub Discussion prior to this advisory.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 | ≥ 2.2.0&&< 2.9.23 | 2.9.23 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 | ≥ 2.10.0&&< 2.10.2 | 2.10.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 to 2.9.23 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.