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NATS.io: Adding accounts for just the system account adds auth bypassGHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23

Fix: nats-io/nats-server#4605

GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is a CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2. A fix is available for github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2023-47090GO-2023-2133
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs58th percentile — riskier than 58% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.44%0.88%1.33%0.3%0.8%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2🐹github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Background

NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.

NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable.

Problem Description

Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication.

Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block.

If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the no_auth_user account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules.

This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access.

But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled.

The blind-spot on our part came from encouraging and documenting a switch to using only "accounts", instead of "authorization".

In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the no_auth_user target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior.

Affected versions

NATS Server:

  • 2.2.0 up to and including 2.9.22 and 2.10.1
  • Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.10.2 and backported to 2.9.23

Workarounds

In the "accounts" block, define a second non-system account, leave it empty.

accounts {
    SYS: {
        users: [
            { user: sysuser, password: makemeasandwich }
        ]
    }
    DUMMY: {}  # for security, before 2.10.2
}
system_account: SYS

Solution

Any one of these:

  1. Upgrade the NATS server to at least 2.10.2 (or 2.9.23)
  2. Or define a dummy account
  3. Or complete the migration of authorization entries to be inside a named account in the "accounts" block

Credits

Problem reported by Alex Herrington.
Addressed publicly in a GitHub Discussion prior to this advisory.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2≥ 2.2.0&&< 2.9.232.9.23go get github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2@v2.9.23
🐹Gogithub.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2≥ 2.10.0&&< 2.10.22.10.2go get github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2@v2.10.2

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
nats-serverlinuxfoundation
≥ 2.10.0 && < 2.10.2
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 to 2.9.23 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Background NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing. NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable. ## Problem Description Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication. Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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