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GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23

Fix: nats-io/nats-server#4605

GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is a CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

NATS.io: Adding accounts for just the system account adds auth bypass

Also known asCVE-2023-47090GO-2023-2133
Published
Oct 19, 2023
Updated
Jul 8, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2🐹github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Background

NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.

NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable.

Problem Description

Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication.

Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block.

If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the no_auth_user account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules.

This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access.

But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled.

The blind-spot on our part came from encouraging and documenting a switch to using only "accounts", instead of "authorization".

In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the no_auth_user target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior.

Affected versions

NATS Server:

  • 2.2.0 up to and including 2.9.22 and 2.10.1
  • Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.10.2 and backported to 2.9.23

Workarounds

In the "accounts" block, define a second non-system account, leave it empty.

accounts {
    SYS: {
        users: [
            { user: sysuser, password: makemeasandwich }
        ]
    }
    DUMMY: {}  # for security, before 2.10.2
}
system_account: SYS

Solution

Any one of these:

  1. Upgrade the NATS server to at least 2.10.2 (or 2.9.23)
  2. Or define a dummy account
  3. Or complete the migration of authorization entries to be inside a named account in the "accounts" block

Credits

Problem reported by Alex Herrington.
Addressed publicly in a GitHub Discussion prior to this advisory.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/nats-io/nats-server/v22.2.0&&< 2.9.232.9.23
🐹Gogithub.com/nats-io/nats-server/v22.10.0&&< 2.10.22.10.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 to 2.9.23 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Background NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing. NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable. ## Problem Description Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication. Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23: v2 | O3 Security